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POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE, MONOGAMOUS
DIVORCE
MICHAEL J. HIGDON†
ABSTRACT
Could the constitutional right to marry also encompass polygamy?
That question, which has long intrigued legal scholars, has taken on
even greater significance in the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges. This
Article answers that question in a novel way by scrutinizing the practice
of plural marriage through the lens of economic game theory, exploring
the extreme harms that would befall the state should polygamy become
law. More specifically, the Article delves into the ex ante consequences
of legalization, not on practicing polygamists (as is typically the focus),
but on sequential bigamists—that is, those who never intend to have
more than one spouse at any given time but who nonetheless marry
more than one person in their lifetime. The Article concludes that the
state has a compelling economic interest in limiting marriage to two
people. If polygamy were to become the law of the land, states could no
longer prohibit bigamy. In turn, separating couples would lose one of
the strongest incentives they currently have to choose formal divorce
proceedings over the seemingly simpler option of mutual desertion: the
threat of criminal charges for bigamy. In essence, a sequential bigamist
could then marry multiple times in his lifetime without ever divorcing
and, at the same time, without risking a criminal charge of bigamy.
Such actions—dubbed “sequential polygamy”—would compromise
the state’s interest in protecting its citizens from financial harms. After
all, divorce proceedings provide the state with an opportunity to
intercede into the process, thereby obtaining some assurance that those
who are leaving a marriage are not doing so at their financial peril.
With the legalization of polygamy, however, bigamy becomes a thing
of the past, eroding the state’s ability to encourage divorce as a means
of safeguarding the health and safety of its citizens. Most concerning is
the impact this change would have on those living in poverty—the
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people likely to be hardest hit by any societal shift away from formal
divorce. Finally, any attempts by the state to distinguish between
bigamy and polygamy (for example, by permitting plural marriage but
only if all spouses consent), would fail to ameliorate the resulting harm
to its citizens.
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Law often amounts to a substitute for trust in situations too complex or
dispersed for trust to arise.
—Ward Farnsworth1

INTRODUCTION
Within the United States, marriage is and always has been limited

1. WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE
LAW 103 (2008).
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to two people.2 Somewhat ironic, then, is the understanding that every
marriage is, in actuality, comprised of three parties—the third being
the state.3 That the state would play such an involved role should come
as little surprise, however, given the state’s “interest in preserving the
integrity of marriages and in safeguarding family relationships.”4 That
interest is particularly acute when it comes to divorce. As one court
aptly explained, “[s]ince marriage is of vital interest to society and the
state . . . in every divorce suit the state is a third party whose interests
take precedence over the private interests of the spouses.”5 Quite simply,
because “[d]ivorce, by its very nature, is likely to result in some social
and financial harm to one or both parties,”6 the state is very much
concerned with watching out for and protecting those going through
the process of marital dissolution. In fact, divorce proceedings are
designed and structured primarily to permit the state to oversee the
process, thus enabling the state to better “protect each of the parties
and their conflicting interests.”7 In order to play that crucial role,
however, the state must first insure that its citizens elect to end their
marriages through formal divorce proceedings, as opposed to the more
informal option of simply deserting one another.
It is helpful at the outset to understand how and why the state
incentivizes individuals to divorce, particularly since this Article
ultimately concludes that legalizing polygamy would undermine the

2. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 114 (2005) (“It goes without saying that monogamy is the controlling
principle of Anglo-American marriage law.”).
3. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (“In a real
sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage: two willing spouses and an approving
State.”); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 13 (N.Y. 2006) (Graffeo, J., concurring) (recognizing
that “[t]here are, in effect, three parties to every marriage, the man, the woman and the State.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Fearon v. Treanor, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936))); Fricke v. Fricke,
42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Wis. 1950) (“There are three parties to a marriage contract—the husband,
the wife, and the state.”).
4. MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 125
(1997).
5. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970) (emphasis added); see also Manion v.
Manion, 363 A.2d 921, 923 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976) (“Our Supreme Court has said . . . ‘in every suit
for divorce the State is in fact if not in name a third party having a substantial interest.’” (quoting
In re Backes, 109 A.2d 273, 275 (1954))); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Ohio 1984) (noting
that the “state is virtually a party to every marital contract in that it possesses a continuing concern
in the financial security of divorced or separated persons”).
6. Gale Humphrey Carpenter, Comment, Protecting the Privacy of Divorcing Parties: The
Move Toward Pseudonymous Filing, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 105, 113 (2001).
7. LENARD MARLOW & S. RICHARD SAUBER, THE HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE MEDIATION
89 (1990); see infra Part III.

HIGDON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

82

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/25/2017 11:59 AM

[Vol. 67:79

state’s ability to effectively incentivize that choice. To explain how the
state incentivizes this choice, it is helpful to look to the example of the
prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma is an often-used example
of a collective action problem.8 The setup is that two prisoners, each
suspected of working with the other to commit a serious crime, are
isolated from one another and given two choices. The first is to confess
to the joint enterprise, and the second is to keep silent. If both prisoners
keep silent, each will be sentenced to one year in prison. If both
confess, implicating one another, each prisoner will receive a sentence
of five years. If, however, one confesses and the other remains silent,
the prisoner who confesses will go free while the prisoner who refuses
to speak will receive a sentence of ten years.
An interesting dilemma thus presents itself—neither prisoner
knows what the other is going to do and, accordingly, when it comes
time for each to decide whether to confess or remain silent, it is unclear
which action would be most beneficial. The most mutually beneficial
option is for both to keep silent, which will result in a sentence of one
year for each prisoner; however, if one suspects that the other plans to
remain silent, then he would, in turn, be tempted to confess. After all,
if he confesses but his partner in crime does not, then he is set free. But
if both fall prey to this same temptation and both confess, then they
each get five years—four years more than if they had simply kept
quiet.9
As illustrated by the prisoner’s dilemma, failure to cooperate can
result (at least from the perspective of the two prisoners) in aggregate
waste—a result that, as any legal economist can attest, the law abhors.10
For that reason, the law actively seeks to encourage cooperation

8. The prisoner’s dilemma is particularly popular within the realm of economic game
theory—an area described as “an amalgam of economics, mathematics, and other sciences, the
purpose of which is to shed light on strategic interaction.” FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 101; see
also GRAHAM ROMP, GAME THEORY: INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATIONS 1 (1997) (“Game
theory is concerned with how rational individuals make decisions when they are mutually
interdependent.”).
9. Quite a few variations of the prisoner’s dilemma exist. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1372 n.105 (1995);
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1138–39 (2000).
10. See Finney Cty. Water Users’ Ass’n v. Graham Ditch Co., 1 F.2d 650, 652 (D. Colo. 1924)
(“As a general principle, equity abhors waste, and delights to restrain it in a proper case.”); Saul
Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 72 (1985) (“Applying the notion of economic
efficiency to tort and contract law often involves a search for the party best able to control a
situation: legal liability is imposed to induce that party to minimize waste.”).
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between parties to achieve efficient, mutually beneficial results.11 The
law does this in two ways: by incentivizing ex ante agreements and, for
those who need extra motivation to cooperate, by threatening
punishment for noncooperation. The hypothetical prisoners in the
prisoner’s dilemma, for instance, would not have found themselves in
that particular quandary had they been permitted to talk with one
another ahead of time and make an enforceable agreement not to
confess. To avoid this inefficiency, the law encourages ex ante
agreement via contracts,12 but it simultaneously uses the threat of ex
post punishment, like the legal penalties found in tort and criminal
law,13 to further encourage cooperation. The theory is that the fear of
sanction will provide the requisite motivation to cooperate.
While the law is sometimes used to promote cooperation and
defuse prisoner’s dilemmas, other times it is used to affirmatively foster
new dilemmas in order to steer parties away from cooperation deemed
harmful to societal interests.14 The focus in discussing the prisoner’s
dilemma has thus far been on what decision would be most beneficial
from the perspective of the two prisoners, but the hypothetical is not
quite that simple. The prisoner’s dilemma, just like marriage, also
involves the interests of a third party, and that third party is the state.
After all, the prisoner’s dilemma presents a situation in which society
would prefer that the parties not cooperate. Indeed, if each prisoner
truly is guilty, punishing both with prison sentences would likely be in
society’s best interest. As a result, the societal benefit of disallowing
cooperation between the prisoners heavily outweighs any benefit such
cooperation would bring the individual parties.
The law recognizes that cooperation is not always desirable for
11. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 15 (2002) (“The law encourages
cooperation in many ways.”); Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and
Financial Re-Regulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1405 (2009) (“[L]aw can help encourage the
initial cooperative move that is so important for encouraging trusting and cooperative
behavior.”).
12. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 102 (“Contracts allow people to limit their options if
others will limit their own in return; they give everyone a convenient way to beat prisoner’s
dilemmas and enjoy the gains that come from cooperation.”).
13. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search
for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 494 (1992) (“[T]he law relies
both on prohibitions of strategic behavior and on measures designed to encourage the parties to
achieve the cooperative solution themselves.”).
14. See GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 84 (2d ed. 2007) (“In many cases, of course, action can be taken to
create prisoner’s dilemmas. Examples include the District Attorney’s separation of the suspects
in the original prisoner’s dilemma, antitrust laws, and open shop laws.”).

HIGDON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

84

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/25/2017 11:59 AM

[Vol. 67:79

society at large, and in such instances, the law can instead “try to
structure their incentives to destroy that possibility.”15 Antitrust laws,
for example, target an area of “unwanted cooperation” involving
“business rivals who get together in smoky hotel rooms and fix the
prices of their wares.”16 Given the harms that would flow from such
practices, “[t]he purpose of antitrust laws is to instead force them into
separate rooms, figuratively speaking, so they will do the individually
rational thing, which is to compete vigorously.”17
In fact, the law is replete with mechanisms that make it rational
for individuals to eschew options that might appear more self-serving
and instead elect options that ultimately benefit the larger group.18 At
the heart of this Article lies one such mechanism: the financial
protections provided to divorcing spouses under the law of divorce. To
understand how divorce operates in that manner, consider the two
options before a married couple who has decided to permanently part
ways. They could simply agree to divide their property informally
between themselves, go their separate ways, and just pretend as though
the marriage never took place. If both remained silent about the fact
that they never divorced, it is unlikely that either would ever be
penalized or even caught.19 Alternatively, they can formally divorce,
15. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 108. Game theory, once again, can help to understand
the process of determining which laws will incentivize cooperation and which will prevent it. See,
e.g., Farrukh B. Akeem, Sports Related Crime: A Game Theory Approach, in MATCH-FIXING IN
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS: EXISTING PROCESSES, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION
STRATEGIES 247, 253 (M.R. Haberfeld & Dale Sheehan eds., 2013) (“Game theory enables the
government to predict which laws will encourage cooperation among parties, and also the laws
that will disincentivize cooperation.”).
16. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 108; see also John K. Setear, Note, Discovery Abuse
Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352, 371 n.101 (1982) (“Where a
complicated case involves two parties with substantial resources, the Prisoner’s Dilemma [sic] is
therefore especially acute.”).
17. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 108. See generally John Shepard Wiley Jr., Reciprocal
Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (1988)
(discussing antitrust laws in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma).
18. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 103 (“We’re all better off if nobody steals . . . than if
everyone does; but that may not be enough to get each of us not to do those things when we
privately decide for ourselves. Conscience is a help then, but perhaps not as convincing as the
threat of coercion.”); see also Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience,
77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1130 n.31 (2002) (“The Prisoner’s Dilemma disregards ethical
considerations; it is simply rational to be selfish in this moral vacuum whenever the temptation to
defect exceeds the benefits of cooperation.”).
19. See, e.g., ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 113 (2013) (“[R]ules against bigamy are not enforced very often. Criminal
prosecutions are rare, . . . [and] [o]n the civil side, various doctrines dilute the force of the
monogamy principle.”); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the civil doctrines designed to
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which entails potentially significant expense, emotional stress, and
perhaps even societal stigma.20 When presented that way, the choice
appears rather simple. The law of domestic relations, however, actively
encourages couples to select the more onerous option of formal
divorce, and it does so in a number of ways: through property-based
incentives and, should those incentives fail, the threat of criminal
prosecutions for bigamy.
First are the property-based incentives. Regardless of whatever
settlement the parties might informally work out between themselves,
each party would likely believe that the formalities and procedures that
accompany a court-supervised divorce proceeding could benefit either
or both parties. First, hiring a divorce attorney, who is a personal
advocate and a family law expert, might result in a more beneficial
outcome.21 Second, because divorce settlements are ultimately
reviewed by courts for fairness, even parties that are not represented
by counsel could be awarded a better deal than would be struck outside
court.22 Finally, even for a wealthier spouse who potentially has more
to lose, divorce is nonetheless an attractive option because it provides
finality, in that it extinguishes any claim a former spouse would have to
property that the wealthier spouse might acquire in the future.23 Thus,
regardless of the parties’ financial interests, the law incentivizes
separating couples to pursue formal divorce proceedings.
Such property-based incentives, however, are unlikely to have
much influence on those divorcing couples who lack significant marital
property. This reduced incentive may explain why poorer individuals,
although more likely to separate, are nonetheless less likely to divorce.24
ameliorate the harms caused by bigamy).
20. See ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND THE
LAW 56 (2012) (noting that “marriage is distinguished by the scope of its penalties—legal,
economic, social, and moral”).
21. See, e.g., Emily S. Taylor Poppe & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Do Lawyers Matter? The Effect
of Legal Representation in Civil Disputes, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 881, 922–23 (2016) (summarizing
studies that found “that legal representation for a plaintiff was associated with an increase in the
odds of an award of alimony or support”).
22. See infra Part III.A.2.
23. Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The
Ascendency of Self over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 100 (2001) (“[P]roperty
acquired after divorce is considered separate property to which an ex-spouse has no claim.”).
24. Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 150–51 (1984) (“[A]lthough the bottom economic
groups produce the highest separation rates, they also show very low divorce rates, thus giving
inferential support to the intuitive conclusion that many poor people who desire a divorce simply
cannot afford one.”).
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As one commentator explains, “One not so uncommon American story
is that of the man who marries, deserts his wife without judicial
dissolution of the marriage, and then takes a new wife.”25 And of
particular significance to the state is the fact that “[t]he story most often
occurs within the lower socioeconomic strata of society—the societal
group whose widowed women are most apt to become welfare
recipients.”26 Thus, the state, in light of its “substantial interest in the
economic and social welfare of its members,”27 requires a more
practical, non-property-based incentive to more fully incentivize
formal divorce.
Criminal law provides such a non-property-based incentive. No
person may legally have more than one spouse.28 Thus, a married
couple who decides to separate must first divorce before either can
remarry. Theoretically, either could take a chance and remarry without
first getting a divorce, but doing so would expose that person to a
potential charge of bigamy.29 More importantly, such action would put
the subsequent spouse in a precarious financial situation.30 Specifically,
that person’s subsequent “spouse” would be denied the benefits and
protections of marriage should the subsequent marriage ultimately be
declared bigamous and, thus, void. Indeed, it is because of the states’
interest in protecting spouses—both former and subsequent—that the
law, predominantly through rules against bigamy, attempts to
encourage separating couples to elect divorce.31 After all, because
divorce proceedings require the participation of the state, divorce
actions assist the state in obtaining assurances that its citizens’
economic interests are being safeguarded.
25. E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Repeal of the Presumption of the Validity of Subsequent Marriages:
Another Irrational Step Toward Increasing the Welfare Roles, 21 MERCER L. REV. 465, 465 (1970).
26. Id.; see also infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
27. Taylor, supra note 25, at 467; see also infra note 38 and accompanying text.
28. See ESTIN, supra note 19, at 113 (“Monogamy is the controlling principle of AngloAmerican marriage law: a person may have only one spouse at a time.”); Taylor, supra note 25,
at 467 (“The more direct criminal bigamy prosecution would seem to be the law’s most
appropriate implement for this purpose.”).
29. See ROBERT L. MADDEX, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 36
(2006) (noting that “[b]igamy is a crime in all states and the District of Columbia, with little
variation among these laws”). Further, bigamy is “generally considered a serious crime punished
as a felony.” Id.
30. See infra Part IV.A.2.
31. See, e.g., Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
353, 420 (2003) (characterizing the Model Penal Code’s definition of bigamy as, essentially, “the
practice of entering into a second purportedly legal marriage without ever legally dissolving an
unsuccessful first marriage” (emphasis added)).
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States, of course, do not have unlimited authority when it comes
to regulating marriage. Indeed, the Supreme Court has struck down a
number of attempts by states to limit access to marriage.32 Most
recently, the Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges33 that, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, states cannot restrict
marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples.34 Instead, same-sex couples
must be granted access to marriage on the same terms as their oppositesex counterparts. That opinion raises the following question: whether
other previously prohibited forms of marriage, including polygamy,
must, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, likewise be
recognized.35 Although currently quite rare in the United States,
polygamy nonetheless exists—primarily in certain religious
communities and in immigrant communities where polygamy is the
traditional way of life.36
In analyzing whether there is a constitutional right to enter into a
polygamous marriage, scholars and commentators have taken
positions on both sides of the argument and have used various
rationales to do so.37 This Article takes a different approach. Looking
at polygamy through the lens of law and economics, this Article
concludes that, even if polygamy were included within the fundamental
right to marriage, the states nonetheless have a compelling justification
for continuing their refusal to recognize plural marriage: their
32. See infra Part II.
33. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
34. Id. at 2584, 2598.
35. See, e.g., Edward Stein, Plural Marriage, Group Marriage and Immutability in Obergefell
v. Hodges and Beyond, 84 UMKC L. REV. 871, 871 (2016); Jonathan E. Amgott, Note, PostWindsor Prospects for Morals Legislation: The Case of Polygamous Immigrants, 26 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 513 passim (2015); Greggary E. Lines, Note, Polymmigration: Immigration
Implications and Possibilities Post Brown v. Buhman, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 477, 478 (2016) (discussing
a recent case in which “a polygamous family argued that Obergefell validated their application for
a marriage license”).
36. See infra Part I.
37. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. One author wrote that:
the right to control the number of persons in a marriage should not receive heightened
scrutiny because the fundamental right to marry cannot be extended to a fundamental
right to marry multiple persons. Therefore, courts should apply rational basis review to
polygamy laws, and the states have more than adequate state interests to meet this level
of scrutiny.
Jonathan A. Porter, L’Amour For Four: Polygyny, Polyamory, and the State’s Compelling
Economic Interest in Normative Monogamy, 64 EMORY L.J. 2093, 2138 (2015); see also Keith E.
Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against
Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 748
(2001) (“The right to marry is a fundamental right subject to the protection of strict scrutiny
analysis, as a result of the close link between the right of marriage and the practice of religion.”).
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substantial interest in promoting divorce among separating couples. If
the Court were to rule that states could not limit marriages to two
people, the consequences would be severe. From a deontological
perspective, there would perhaps be fewer difficulties for those who
actively and knowingly engage in polygamy.38 Under a consequentialist
approach, however, the ex ante result of removing prohibitions against
polygamy would be that nonpolygamous couples could agree to
separate informally and later marry other people without any fear that
they might be prosecuted for bigamy—“the criminal law under which
polygamy is typically prosecuted”39—and also without any fear that
their latest spouse would be denied the legal protections of marriage.40
In other words, legalizing polygamy would eliminate one of the
strongest incentives couples currently have to choose formal divorce.
The result would be that divorcing couples, just like the prisoners in
the prisoner’s dilemma, would be even more tempted to cooperate in
38. This conclusion is doubtful. Polygamy would likely create a number of issues, including
child custody, property distribution at divorce, and intestate succession. Even more troubling are
the concerns about how, in practice, legalized polygamy can become a mechanism for subjugating
women. See SHEILA JEFFREYS, MAN’S DOMINION: THE RISE OF RELIGION AND THE ECLIPSE OF
WOMEN’S RIGHTS 151 (2011) (“The harms of polygamy differ as to context, but reports from all
forms of the practice, across both multicultural states and states where polygamy is a traditional
practice, demonstrate severe harms to women and children.”).
39. Claire A. Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in the U.S.
Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 382, 383–84 (2009). Just as the law today uses the
terms “bigamy” and “polygamy” as interchangeable, so too does this Article. See Marjorie A.
Shields, Annotation, Validity of Bigamy and Polygamy Statutes and Constitutional Provisions, 22
A.L.R.6th 1, § 2, at 6 (2007) (“[T]he terms bigamy and polygamy are now used interchangeably.”).
It should be noted, however, that, in some instances, the law has attempted to use the terms in
such a way that they refer to two distinct practices. Under the Model Penal Code, for instance,
bigamy occurs when a “married person . . . contracts or purports to contract another marriage.”
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1980). In contrast, polygamy occurs if a person
“marries or cohabits with more than one spouse at a time in purported exercise of the right of
plural marriage.” Id. § 230.1(2).
40. In taking this approach, it is not the intent of this Article to wade into the debate about
whether consequentialist arguments are appropriate when it comes to constitutional
decisionmaking. See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 411 (1990)
(examining “two common understandings of legal pragmatism: pragmatism as forward-looking
instrumentalism, and pragmatism as a hostility to abstract theory, formalism, and
foundationalism”); see also Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the
Constitution is a “Suicide Pact,” 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 293 (2011) (“[T]he
fundamental dispute of whether principles must dominate, or are dominated by, consequences
continues to fume among professed deontologists, avowed consequentialists and those who
espouse hybrid approaches.”). Instead, it is my hope that even those who have been most critical
of such an approach would nonetheless agree that it has merit in this context. See, e.g., Ronald
Dworkin, Reply, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 432, 433 (1997) (“Of course, in some circumstances, pointing
out that a doctrine will have surprising consequences—that a welfare program designed to help a
particular group will actually harm that group, for example—is obviously immensely helpful.”).
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an enterprise that, despite appearing more personally beneficial, is
ultimately harmful to the larger society. That enterprise would be
permanent separation—and perhaps even subsequent remarriage to a
new spouse—without legally terminating the first marriage. In such
situations, great harm could quite easily accrue to the first spouse, who
never received a day in court to ensure fair treatment and equitable
division of assets.41 Likewise, a subsequent spouse would be harmed by
learning that the marriage was not, in fact, monogamous, and
consequentially, that as merely one of several spouses, any property
rights from the marriage are accordingly diluted.42 All of these harms
would, in turn, significantly undermine the states’ interest in protecting
the “communal health, comfort, and welfare”43 of their citizens—
“collective interests that no individual, acting alone, has the capacity to
vindicate.”44 Finally, any attempts by the state to ameliorate those
harms by crafting additional, more stringent requirements for plural
marriage—such as requiring the consent of all parties—would
ultimately fail given the very real concerns with duress that surround
polygamous marriage.45
To develop this argument, Part I of this Article explores the
evolution of the practice of polygamy and the current role that it plays
in the United States. Part II then looks at the institution of marriage,
focusing on its evolution from an institution within the states’ complete
authority to a fundamental right subject to significant constitutional
protections. Shifting from marriage to divorce, Part III explores the
protections that legal divorce affords spouses, both current and
subsequent, as well as the incentives built into family law to encourage
formal divorce among separating couples. Finally, Part IV argues that
a ruling requiring the states to permit polygamy would eviscerate not
only the incentives favoring divorce, but the corresponding protections
the practice affords, resulting in substantial harm to both the individual
and the state—harms that cannot be overcome by attempting to limit

41. See infra Part IV.A.1.
42. See infra Part IV.A.2.
43. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 91 (2016).
44. Id.; see also Michael L. Rich, Brass Rings and Red-Headed Stepchildren: Protecting Active
Criminal Informants, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (2012) (“The protection of the vulnerable is
one of the principal duties of society and a foundational goal of the legal system.”).
45. See infra Part IV.B; see also Jacob Richards, Note, Autonomy, Imperfect Consent, and
Polygamist Sex Rights Claims, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 197, 201 (2010) (“[S]ubcultural and religious
constraints make the consent of women to polygamous relationships questionable or invalid.”).
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the availability of polygamy to those who affirmatively consent to
entering into such a marriage.
I. POLYGAMY: PRACTICE AND PREVALENCE WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES
At one time, polygamy was permitted in most parts of the world.
Today, however, polygamy is largely relegated to countries in Africa,
the Middle East, and Asia.46 Within the United States, the practice has
always been—to put it mildly—disfavored. In fact, since America’s
earliest days, the practice has been strictly illegal. “At the time of the
founding of the nation, England and Wales prohibited polygamy, and
each of the original thirteen states passed antipolygamy statutes.
Criminalization was the norm.”47
It would be a mistake, however, to trace current prohibitions and
public attitudes about polygamy solely to those early laws.48 Instead,
current restrictions exist largely as a reaction to the emergence in the
1800s of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church):
Polygamy in the United States is often considered to be “human-

46. MARTHA BAILEY & AMY J. KAUFMAN, POLYGAMY IN THE MONOGAMOUS WORLD:
MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGES FOR WESTERN LAW AND POLICY 7 (2010); see also Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern
and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.”).
47. Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 108 (2006).
48. See id. (“The history of the criminalization of polygamy in the United States—especially
the enforcement of any prohibitions on polygamous family structures—reveals a far more
complex story than ‘once and always banned.’”). In a case from 1890, the Supreme Court provided
a glimpse into the early objections to the practice of plural marriage when Justice Field
characterized such unions as follows: “They tend to destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to
disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman, and to debase man. Few crimes are more
pernicious to the best interests of society, and receive more general or more deserved
punishment.” Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890). Justice Field also stated that “[b]igamy
and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries,” indicating that both
religious and racial discrimination likely motivated early prohibitions. Id. In terms of
contemporary objections to the practice of polygamy, however, Professor Maura Irene Strassberg
identifies two primary arguments: first, “protecting women and children from crimes such as
‘incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, and failure to pay child support’”; and second, “the state’s
‘interest in preventing [both] the misuse of government benefits associated with marital status’ as
well [as] the crime of ‘failure to pay child support.’” Maura Irene Stassberg, Can We Still
Criminalize Polygamy: Strict Scrutiny of Polygamy Laws Under State Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts After Hobby Lobby, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1605, 1617, 1622 (2016) (first alteration
in original) (quoting State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 744 (Utah 2006); then quoting State v. Green,
99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004)).
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made” in the sense that it can be readily tracked to a specific
individual . . . . By all accounts, on July 12, 1843, Joseph Smith, Jr.,
informed the members of the church that he had a revelation that the
faith should adopt the practice of plural marriage. . . . More than 30
years after Smith’s revelation, the Mormon scriptures finally included
written documentation of the event.49

Joseph Smith, himself, would ultimately wed at least thirty-three
women,50 and the LDS Church would come to classify polygamy as not
only “a necessary step to reach the highest levels of heaven, but as a
prerequisite for the second coming of Jesus Christ on Earth, and as a
requirement for advancement within the Church.”51
The reaction of the federal government was both swift and severe.
Characterized—along with slavery—as one of the “twin relics of
barbarism,”52 polygamy quickly became the subject of two
congressional acts designed to eradicate the practice. The first was the
1862 Morrill Act, which criminalized bigamy by providing that no
married individual could “marry any other person, whether married or
single, in a Territory of the United States.”53 Those who violated the
Act could be fined, imprisoned or both.54 The law, clearly aimed at the
LDS Church in the then-territory of Utah, ultimately did very little to
achieve its goal of punishing polygamists and thus discouraging the
practice. Under the territory’s existing laws, any conviction would have
had to be handed down by a jury, which, as a practical matter, would
have been comprised predominantly of other, sympathetic Mormons.55

49. MARILYN J. COLEMAN & LAWRENCE H. GANONG, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN FAMILY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1049 (2014); see CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS, http://scriptures.lds.org/dc/132/61-62
[https://perma.cc/5YZP-FLFX] (“[I]f any man espouse a virgin, and desire to espouse another,
and the first give her consent, and if he espouse the second, and they are virgins, and have vowed
to no other man, then . . . he cannot commit adultery with that that belongeth unto him and to no
one else.”).
50. See TODD COMPTON, IN SACRED LONELINESS: THE PLURAL WIVES OF JOSEPH SMITH
10 (1997) (identifying thirty-three wives). But see GEORGE D. SMITH, NAUVOO POLYGAMY 54
(2008) (putting the number at thirty-seven wives).
51. BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 84.
52. Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 307 (2010).
53. The Morrill Act of 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
54. Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peay’s Horses: The Federal Response to Mormon Polygamy,
1854–1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 38 (2001) (“Multiple marriages subjected the offender
to a five hundred dollar fine, five years in prison, or both.”).
55. Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1192–93 (2011) (“Mormons still exercised absolute control over Utah’s legal
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In 1874, then, Congress passed the Poland Act, at the heart of which
were provisions giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving
criminal bigamy, thus essentially “transferring plural marriage cases
from the Mormon-controlled probate courts to the non-Mormon
federal system.”56
Believing the criminalization of polygamy unconstitutional, the
LDS Church challenged Congress’s attempts to target polygamy. After
George Reynolds was charged with bigamy under the Morrill Act,57 he
challenged the conviction all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court,
arguing that the conviction violated his First Amendment right to
religious liberty. The Court, in Reynolds v. United States,58 unanimously
rejected this argument. As an initial matter, the Court noted that First
Amendment protections encompass religious beliefs but not religious
actions “in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”59
Turning then to the “action” of polygamy, the Court ruled that the
Founders did not intend the First Amendment to cover such activity:
Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western
nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of
African people. At common law, the second marriage was always
void, and from the earliest history of England polygamy has been
treated as an offence against society. . . . [Furthermore,] we think it
may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the
Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society,
cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less
severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that
the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to
prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social

apparatus. The territorial legislature . . . grant[ed] extensive criminal jurisdiction to the local
probate courts, but it also empowered local Mormon marshals, rather than federal officials, to
summon jurors even for the federal courts.”).
56. Campbell, supra note 54, at 39.
57. George Reynolds, who was secretary to the president of the LDS Church, agreed to
participate in this test case. See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION:
POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 114 (2003).
58. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
59. Id. at 164. Subsequently, in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), the Court questioned
the Mormons’ right to even believe. There, the Court upheld a statute that required voters in the
then-territory of Idaho to sign an oath swearing that they were not “a member of any order,
organization, or association which teaches, advises, counsels, or encourages its members,
devotees, or any other person, to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy.” Id. at 347.
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The Court concluded that Reynolds’ argument—which would allow
people to flout the law if their religion mandated it—would “make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect [] permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”61
According to Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, “Government
could exist only in name under such circumstances.”62
Acceptance of the Court’s ruling that religious liberty does not
shield members of the LDS Church from criminal prosecution, coupled
with additional congressional acts that increased the penalties and
grounds for prosecution relating to polygamy,63 led to waning support
among Mormons.64 Soon thereafter, even the Church itself started
distancing itself from the practice of plural marriage. In 1890, the
president of the LDS Church officially declared that the Church “did
not teach polygamy or plural unions and did not permit any Church
member to enter into such a union.”65 In light of this development—
and the fact that Utah Territory had proposed a state constitution that
expressly prohibited polygamy—Utah was finally granted statehood in
1896.66
Although the LDS Church officially disavowed the practice over
125 years ago, polygamy nonetheless continues to exist within smaller,
often isolated communities that identify themselves as fundamentalist

60. Id. at 164–65. As this quote suggests, the United States’ reaction to polygamy was
motivated, at least in part, by racism, xenophobia, and religious intolerance. See supra note 48.
61. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
62. Id.
63. See generally Campbell, supra note 54, at 40–51 (discussing the Edmunds Act, ch. 47,
§§ 1, 3, 22 Stat. 30, 30–31 (1882) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1461) (repealed 1983) and the EdmundsTucker Act, ch. 397, §§ 17–18, 24 Stat. 635 (1887) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 633, 660) (repealed
1978)).
64. See R. Michael Otto, “Wait ‘Til Your Mothers Get Home”: Assessing the Rights of
Polygamists as Custodial and Adoptive Parents, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 881, 894 (“By 1890, the weight
of this authority had become too much for even the resilient Mormons to withstand. The
imprisonment or forced exile of many of the Church’s leading authorities had all but decimated
the Church.”).
65. BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 93; see also JOHN WITTE, JR., THE WESTERN
CASE OF MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY 436–37 (2015) (“Although polygamous ideas and
practices lingered for a generation, giving rise to internal ecclesiastical disputes and cases, by 1906,
the Mormon Church had made the preaching and practice of polygamy a ground for
excommunication.”).
66. See Sandra Day O’Connor, The History of the Women’s Suffrage Movement, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 657, 663 (1996).
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Mormon.67 Statistics relating to just how many of these communities
remain are difficult to come by; nonetheless, it has been estimated that
there are between 37,000 and 100,000 such polygamists living in the
United States and Canada.68 The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (FLDS)—one of the larger organized
communities practicing polygamy—has been estimated to have about
8,000 members alone.69 Although plural marriages within these
communities remain both invalid and illegal, prosecutions for bigamy
are exceedingly rare.70
In addition to Mormon fundamentalists, the United States also
encounters incidences of polygamy within certain immigrant
communities.71 Not all countries ban polygamy, so “[e]ach year,
hundreds of thousands of immigrants enter the United States from
countries in which polygamy is legal.”72 Given the concern that plural
marriage might immigrate into the United States along with those who
practice it, Congress has repeatedly attempted to bar polygamists from
entering the United States:

67. D. Michael Quinn, Plural Marriage and Mormon Fundamentalism, in
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY 240, 276 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993)
(“There are ten times more polygamists now in the United States than in 1862, the year of the
first federal law against polygamy.”).
68. BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 95.
69. Id. (“Members of the FLDS believe they are the true Latter-day Saints, as they are living
Joseph Smith’s revelation that men must have at least three wives to enter the highest realm of
heaven.”).
70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, many in these communities have
been subject to police investigation and criminal prosecution for other crimes, typically those
relating to sexual abuse of minors. See generally Martin Guggenheim, Texas Polygamy and Child
Welfare, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 759 (2009) (discussing the two major efforts police undertook to break
up polygamous communities); Jonathan Turley, The Loadstone Rock: The Role of Harm in the
Criminalization of Plural Unions, 64 EMORY L.J. 1905 (2015) (discussing a Canadian case alleging
sexual abuse against polygamists); Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Texas Mis-Step: Why the Largest
Child Removal in Modern U.S. History Failed, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 449 (2010)
(discussing the breakup of the Yearning for Zion Ranch community of polygamists where a minor
alleged that her spiritual husband sexually abused her); Amy Fry, Comment, Polygamy in
America: How the Varying Legal Standards Fail To Protect Mothers and Children from Its Abuses,
54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 967 (2010) (recounting situations where minors were the subjects of crimes
in polygamous communities).
71. See Jamie M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage—Allies or Adversaries Within the
Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559, 577 (2008) (“In addition to
fundamentalist Mormons, it is suspected that there are a significant number of immigrant families
engaging in polygamy in the United States.”).
72. Smearman, supra note 39, at 385 (“According to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), in 2007 alone, close to half a million immigrants obtained lawful permanent resident status
from countries in which polygamy is practiced in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.”).
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[P]olygamy has been a bar to admission to the United States since the
Immigration Act of 1891. Polygamy as a ground of inadmissibility
casts a long shadow throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 (INA), the foundation of present immigration law. Currently
codified at INA § 212(a)(10)(A), the polygamy ground of
inadmissibility (the polygamy bar) is incorporated into numerous
provisions of the INA, ranging from adjustment of status (the process
for obtaining a green card) to deportation and naturalization. The
INA does not recognize a polygamous marriage as a valid marriage
for immigration purposes, includes polygamy as a statutory bar to a
finding of good moral character, and lists bigamy, the criminal law
under which polygamy is typically prosecuted, [as] a crime of moral
turpitude.73

But such attempts can hardly be expected to weed out every polygamist
who attempts to enter the country. In addition, these prohibitions only
apply to practicing polygamists and not to individuals who, though not
currently practicing, emigrate from cultures where plural marriage is
encouraged and perhaps expected. It should therefore come as little
surprise to discover that polygamy exists in a variety of immigrant
communities in the United States, ranging “from groups of African
immigrants in New York City to Hmong immigrants from Vietnam
living in Minneapolis.”74
In sum, plural marriage has a long history of being subject to
criminal prohibition and widespread social condemnation in the
United States. Nonetheless, the practice survives in communities
throughout the country to this day. Many believe the number of people
living in polygamous households may continue to grow.75 As a result,
the Court’s recent decision legalizing same-sex marriage—which, like
polygamy, was also once subject to legal and social disdain—has led
73. Id. at 383–84.
74. Id. at 387; see also BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 96 (referencing a radio show
on NPR that “profiled a family in Philadelphia where the husband, already married to one
woman, had gone through a Muslim religious marriage ceremony with another woman”).
75. See JANET BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME: MEDIA, GENDER, AND POLITICS IN
MORMON FUNDAMENTALISM 263 (2012) (discussing the “growing number of Muslims who
believe they are allowed four wives according to the Quran”); Cyra Akila Choudhury, Between
Tradition and Progress: A Comparative Perspective on Polygamy in the United States and India,
83 U. COLO. L. REV. 963, 967 (2012) (“[T]he practice flourishes in some communities even if
driven into the closet by the law, and its incidence in the United States might be increasing.”);
Pauline Bartolone, Opinion, For These Muslims, Polygamy Is an Option, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE (Aug. 5, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/For-these-Muslimspolygamy-is-an-option-2549200.php [https://perma.cc/96ER-YTL2] (describing increased
practice of polygamy among African-American Muslims).
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people to question whether plural marriage could soon follow suit. In
considering that ultimate question, however, it would be short sighted
to focus exclusively on the impact legalization would have on the
polygamous communities discussed here; instead, one must also take
into account the effect legalization might have on sequential bigamists.
And, as discussed below in Parts III and IV, that impact would be
significant.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Although the law of domestic relations is generally seen as the
exclusive province of the states, the Supreme Court has, over time,
increasingly limited the states’ ability to regulate marriage. This
evolution has taken place relatively recently: in 1888, the Supreme
Court in Maynard v. Hill76 recognized, albeit in dicta, that “[m]arriage
. . . has always been subject to the control of the legislature.”77 If that
standard were still the case today, polygamy would likely have no
chance of resurrection. After all, no state permits plural marriage.78
Every state has explicitly made the practice illegal. For political
reasons, it is unlikely that a state would legislatively reverse course.
Since Maynard was written, however, the Supreme Court has
recognized that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, there are notable limits to a state’s ability to regulate
marriage.79 Specifically, the Court has declared that, under the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the right to marry is a fundamental right.80 Accordingly,
any law depriving a citizen of that right is subject to strict scrutiny,
requiring that law to be a necessary response to a compelling
government objective81—a level of scrutiny routinely described as
“strict in theory, fatal in fact.”82 In light of these constitutional
76. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1887).
77. Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
78. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text; see also Anne Laquer Estin, Underground
Family Law, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED
MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION 92, 115 (Joel A. Nichols ed.,
2011) (“Official laws in the United States prohibit and sanction polygamy at every level, from
national immigration statutes to local criminal law.”).
79. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (recognizing that the states’
interest in regulating marriage is limited by constitutional guarantees).
80. See infra notes 85–98 and accompanying text.
81. Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental
Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1787 (1992).
82. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting how “subject to strict scrutiny”
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limitations, it might be that—and indeed some have argued that83—
states cannot prohibit polygamous marriages.84
Although the Court noted the importance of the right to marry as
early as 1942,85 it was not until the Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v.
Virginia86 that the Court would explicitly characterize the right as
fundamental.87 In Loving, the Court was confronted with Virginia’s
antimiscegenation statute, which made it “unlawful for any white
person in [Virginia] to marry [anyone except another] white person.”88
Richard Loving and Mildred Jeter, an interracial couple, had violated
the statute when they married in D.C. and subsequently moved to
Virginia.89 After being arrested, the two pled guilty and received a oneyear jail sentence.90 The judge suspended their sentence but only on the
condition that they leave the state for twenty-five years.91 In ruling as
he did, the judge infamously reasoned, “Almighty God created the
races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on
separate continents . . . . The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix.”92
On appeal, the Court first noted that “[w]hile the state court is no
has often been thought of as a “euphemism for ‘absolutely forbidden’”).
83. See, e.g., Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional
Right to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 2044 (2015) (taking the position that “as the state
remains in the marriage business, it must legally recognize any intimate relationship that
competent, consenting adults want to form, regardless of its number, gender composition, or
interpersonal dynamics, provided that the behaviors do not violate other valid laws”); Jack B.
Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 89, 146 (2015) (“Has the Supreme
Court, both in its cases recognizing the fundamental right to marry and in its developing gay rights
jurisprudence . . . created a pathway for a future recognition of polygamous marriage? This
Article argues that is indeed what the Court has done.”).
84. See Casey E. Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor: What’s Religion Got to Do with It?, 9
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 528 (2015) (“[H]igher courts and legislatures may very well have to
square the issue of polygamy with modern conceptions of marriage and liberty sooner than
anticipated.”).
85. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”).
86. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
87. ROGER J. R. LEVESQUE, CHILD MALTREATMENT AND THE LAW: RETURNING TO FIRST
PRINCIPLES 46 (2009) (noting that, prior to Loving, “the Court had yet to rule that marriage itself
was a fundamental right deserving robust constitutional protection”).
88. Loving, 388 U.S. at 5 n.4.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. For a more comprehensive discussion of the Lovings and their journey to the Supreme
Court, see generally Robert A. Pratt, The Case of Mr. and Mrs. Loving: Reflections on the Fortieth
Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 7 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008).
92. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting the Virginia trial judge).
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doubt correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to
the State’s police power, the State [correctly] does not contend . . . that
its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.”93 In other words, what the
Court had previously stated in Maynard about the states’ broad
authority to regulate marriage was actually subject to constitutional
regulations. The Court then turned to two such constitutional
limitations to strike down the Virginia law. First, the Court held that
the statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.94 As the Court noted, the statute “prohibits only
interracial marriages involving white persons,” and was thus designed
to promote white supremacy.95
Although the Court’s opinion could have stopped there, the Court
went on to hold that the statute also ran afoul of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that “[t]he
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”96 In
light of that recognition, the Court spent little time finding that the
Virginia law violated substantive due process:
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of
liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom
to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.97

With that, the Court ruled that the Virginia law was unconstitutional.
In the process, the Court issued what is today regarded as one of its
most landmark decisions relating to the law of the family.98

93. Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)).
94. Id. at 11. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the state’s proffered justifications
“‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,’ and to prevent ‘the corruption of blood,’ ‘a
mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration of racial pride . . . .’” Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v.
Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)).
95. Id. at 11.
96. Id. at 12.
97. Id.
98. See Robert A. Destro, Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After 30
Years: Introduction, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (1998) (“Loving v. Virginia is, by any
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Since Loving, the Court has decided three other key cases in which
it has reaffirmed its understanding of marriage as a fundamental right.99
A little over ten years after Loving, the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail100
was confronted with a Wisconsin statute that prohibited a noncustodial
parent who had to pay child support from obtaining a marriage license
without court approval.101 The statute further prohibited a court from
granting such permission unless the support obligation had been met
and the children in question “[were] not then and [were] not likely
thereafter to become public charges.”102 Roger Redhail brought a
constitutional challenge to the law after his request for a marriage
license was denied.103 The Court ruled that the Wisconsin law
unconstitutionally violated his fundamental right to marry.104 The
Court noted that, under the statute in question, individuals like
Redhail, who were incapable of paying their child support obligation,
would be “absolutely prevented from getting married.”105 For others,
who were “able in theory to satisfy the statute’s requirements,” they
could nonetheless “be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that
they will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry.”106
Given the degree to which the Wisconsin statute interfered with
the fundamental right to marry, the Court applied strict scrutiny,
meaning that the law in question could only be upheld if “supported by
sufficiently important state interests” and “closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests.”107 Despite the state’s attempts to
justify the law, the Court ruled that, even if those interests were
“legitimate and substantial,” the statute could not be upheld because it
was simply too broad.108 Thus, “the means selected by the State for
definition, a landmark case.”); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV.
825, 854–55 (2004) (“Legal authorities and legal scholars consistently identify Loving as one of
the most crucial decisions in family law, illuminating family law’s nature and core values.”).
99. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
100. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
101. Id. at 375.
102. Id. (quoting WIS. STAT. § 245.10 (repealed 1977)).
103. Id. at 376.
104. Id. at 383.
105. Id. at 387. Redhail fathered a child while he was in high school and, at the time Redhail
sought to obtain a marriage license, he had not only failed to satisfy his support obligations to the
child, but “the child had been a public charge since her birth, receiving benefits under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program.” Id. at 377–78.
106. Id. at 377.
107. Id. at 388.
108. Id.
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achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to
marry.”109 In an attempt to clarify what forms of state regulation
pertaining to marriage were permissible, the Court was clear that it did
not “mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any
way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected
to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do
not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may legitimately be imposed.”110
Almost ten years later, in Turner v. Safley,111 the Court would once
again be called upon to apply the fundamental right to marriage. In
that case, the law at issue arose from regulations promulgated by the
Missouri Division of Corrections.112 The regulation in question,
motivated by security concerns,113 permitted “an inmate to marry only
with the permission of the superintendent of the prison, and provide[d]
that such approval should be given only ‘when there are compelling
reasons to do so.’”114 The Court ruled that the regulation in question
was far too overinclusive and, thus, unconstitutional.115 Specifically, the
Court stated that “[t]here are obvious, easy alternatives to the Missouri
regulation that accommodate the right to marry while imposing a de
minimis burden on the pursuit of security objectives.”116 In sum, the
Court concluded that, although “Missouri prison officials may regulate
the time and circumstances under which the marriage ceremony itself
takes place . . . . [But] the almost complete ban on the decision to marry
109. Id. The interests put forward by the state were twofold. First, “the permission-to-marry
proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the necessity of fulfilling his
prior support obligations . . . .” Id. Second, the state expressed interests in encouraging
noncustodial parents to meet and maintain their support obligations, and in protecting “the ability
of marriage applicants to meet support obligations to prior children by preventing the applicants
from incurring new support obligations” that might arise from a subsequent marriage. Id. at 390.
110. Id. at 386.
111. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
112. Id. at 81.
113. Id. at 97. The justifications advanced by Missouri included security concerns relating to
the fear “that ‘love triangles’ might lead to violent confrontations between inmates” and
rehabilitation concerns relating to the need for female inmates to focus on developing selfreliance. Id. To the latter point, the state argued that the “female prisoners often were subject to
abuse at home or were overly dependent on male figures, and that this dependence or abuse was
connected to the crimes they had committed.” Id.
114. Id. at 82. The Court explained that “[t]he term ‘compelling’ is not defined, but prison
officials testified at trial that generally only a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child would
be considered a compelling reason.” Id.
115. Id. at 97–98.
116. Id. at 98 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 551.10 (1986) (allowing inmates in federal prison to marry
unless warden finds that the marriage would threaten security, order, or public safety)).
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is not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives.”117
Whereas Loving, Turner, and Zablocki all involved marriage
restrictions deemed unconstitutional, lower courts have upheld a
variety of other state restrictions on marriage. These restrictions
include age requirements,118 prohibitions against incestuous
marriage,119 and statutes requiring blood tests as a condition of
marriage.120 In such instances, the laws at issue were seen merely as
“reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with
decisions to enter into the marital relationship.”121 As LGBT advocates
began advocating for same-sex marriage, however, states began to
supplement these restrictions by adding gender requirements to their
marriage laws.122 The question became whether such restrictions were
within the province of the state or if, like the restrictions at issue in
Turner, Zablocki, and Loving, these statutes were instead
unconstitutional.
In 2015, that question was answered by the Court’s historic ruling
in Obergefell v. Hodges.123 In that case, the Court was called upon to
decide whether a state could constitutionally deny same-sex couples
the right to marry. The Court began by reaffirming its prior holdings
that “the right to marry is protected by the Constitution.”124 The Court,
however, could not rely exclusively on those prior holdings, given that
each had clearly “presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex

117. Id. at 99.
118. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that parental
consent requirement for marriages by minors “does not offend the constitutional rights of minors
but represents a constitutionally valid exercise of state power”).
119. See, e.g., Singh v. Singh, 569 A.2d 1112, 1121 (Conn. 1990) (upholding state statute that
voids incestuous marriage); State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321, 1330 (Del. 1981) (allowing an incest
prosecution to proceed against a half brother and half sister who wed).
120. See, e.g., Peterson v. Widule, 147 N.W. 966, 971 (Wis. 1914) (upholding state law
requiring a blood test as a condition precedent to receiving a marriage license).
121. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). In fact, Justice Stewart, in his concurrence
in Zablocki, opined that:
[s]urely, for example, a State may legitimately say that no one can marry his or her
sibling, that no one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that no one can marry
without first passing an examination for venereal disease, or that no one can marry who
has a living husband or wife.
Id. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring).
122. See Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 131, 192 (2009) (noting that, in 2009, “[f]orty-five states prohibit[ed] same-sex marriage by
statute, constitutional amendment, or both”).
123. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
124. Id. at 2598.
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partners.”125 Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that a
closer analysis of these previous cases “compels the conclusion that
same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”126 Specifically, the
Court identified four essential “principles and traditions” related to
marriage that justify its classification as a fundamental right—
principles and traditions that, according to the Court, apply with equal
force to same-sex couples.127
First, the Court declared that “the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy.”128 Citing Loving, the Court recognized that “[t]here is
dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry
and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.”129 Second, the
Court cited the understanding that marriage “supports a two-person
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals.”130 The Court explained that “[m]arriage responds to the
universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one
there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and
assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the
other.”131 Third, the Court looked to other individual rights to reveal
that marriage “safeguards children and families and thus draws
meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and
education.”132 Quoting Zablocki, where the Court held that “[t]he right
to marry, establish a home and bring up children is a central part of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,”133 the Court went on to
explain that “[b]y giving recognition and legal structure to their
parents’ relationship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other

125. Id. The Court had, in fact, previously issued a decision relating to same-sex couples and
their right to marry. In Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.), the Court dismissed an
appeal from a decision disallowing same-sex marriage for want of a federal question. Id.
Obergefell overruled Baker. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
126. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Court also explained that “[t]he nature of marriage is that, through its enduring
bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and
spirituality.” Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2600.
132. Id.
133. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).
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families in their community and in their daily lives.’”134 Finally, the
Court, relying on both precedent and tradition, held that “marriage is
a keystone of our social order.”135 In other words, marriage is “the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress.”136 In recognition of that importance,
“just as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to
support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits
to protect and nourish the union.”137
Having broken marriage down into those elements justifying its
recognition as a fundamental right, the Court then turned its attention
to same-sex unions, where it found no basis for holding that such
relationships fall outside this right:
Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of
marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central
meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. With that
knowledge must come the recognition that laws excluding same-sex
couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind
prohibited by our basic charter.138

Accordingly, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying same-sex
couples the ability to marry on terms equal to those available to
opposite-sex couples.139
In ruling as it did, the Court made sure to note that “these cases
involve only the rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would
pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.”140 Thus, there is
nothing in Obergefell that would explicitly require a state to recognize
a plural marriage. Indeed, no court has applied Obergefell to reach such
a conclusion. Some have nonetheless argued that the four principles of
marriage outlined by Justice Kennedy could apply with equal force to

134. Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)). The Court
continued: “Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important to children’s best
interests.” Id.
135. Id. at 2601.
136. Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2602.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2607 (emphasis added).
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polygamous marriages.141 After all, if the fact that marriage had
historically been defined as male-female was no impediment to samesex marriage, why should the fact that it has been traditionally limited
to two people prevent plural marriage from likewise falling within the
fundamental right? Justice Roberts, in his dissent, suggested that such
a ruling would actually be less remarkable than the one reached by the
majority. “[F]rom the standpoint of history and tradition, a leap from
opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is much greater than one
from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in
some cultures around the world.”142
III. THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION OF DIVORCE
Legal divorce offers a variety of protections—protections that
extend not only to the divorcing parties themselves, but also to those
parties’ subsequent spouses. As noted earlier and discussed more fully
below, it is these protections that incentivize separating couples, who
might find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma leading them to informal
separation, to instead opt for formal divorce. Indeed, the states have a
strong interest in promoting divorce—by protecting the parties to the
marriage, divorce likewise advances the states’ substantial interest in
“the protection of an economically vulnerable spouse from great
financial hardship at the end of marriage.”143 Because divorce cannot
exist without marriage, however, one must first understand the states’
interest in marriage before one can fully understand the legal and
societal value of divorce.
In short, marriage helps provide stability to adult relationships and
also helps protect the welfare of the children resulting from those
relationships.144 Marriage is thus an institution that American law
strives to actively promote and encourage beyond its status as a

141. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
142. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
143. Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 229, 233 (1994); see also Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison
of the State’s Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for
Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283, 331 (1991) (“[T]he state’s parens
patriae power serves to protect all individuals of the state who cannot protect themselves.”).
144. See Maxine Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State’s
Regulation of Intimate Relationships Between Adults, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 43 (2007)
(noting the “important role the state can play in creating a stable environment that fosters the
well-being of children by formalizing and privileging relationships such as marriage”).
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fundamental right.145 To make marriage a more attractive option, the
law extends a number of advantages to married couples—what Justice
Kennedy in Obergefell referred to as a “constellation of benefits”146:
These aspects of marital status include: taxation; inheritance and
property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the
law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority;
adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death
certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions;
workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody,
support, and visitation rules. Valid marriage under state law is also a
significant status for over a thousand provisions of federal law.147

According to Justice Kennedy, this panoply of rights partly contributes
to the very classification of marriage as a fundamental right: “The
States have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage
right by placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the
legal and social order.”148
The flip side of marriage is, of course, divorce. Just as states aim
to encourage marriage, it is the policy of every state to discourage
divorce.149 It may seem somewhat ironic, then, that the states have—in
the not too distant past—made divorce much easier to obtain.150 The
most notable example of that shift would be the adoption of no-fault
145. See Huiet v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 28 S.E.2d 83, 84 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943) (“Marriage is
encouraged by the law, and every effort to restrain or discourage marriage by contract, condition,
limitation, or otherwise, shall be invalid and void.” (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 53-107 (1933))).
146. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601; see also Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples,
72 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 359 (1995) (noting the “panoply of entitlements and privileges that
come as part of the institution of marriage”).
147. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (citations omitted); see also Kara S. Suffredini & Madeleine
V. Findley, Speak Now: Progressive Considerations on the Advent of Civil Marriage for Same-Sex
Couples, 45 B.C. L. REV. 595, 598 n.10 (2004) (detailing some of the “1138 federal benefits, rights,
and obligations” that flow from marriage).
148. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
149. See Tiffany N. Lee, Divorce and Dissolution, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 347, 360 (2001)
(noting that many states, in response to the shift to no-fault divorce, have “taken measures to
discourage divorce”); Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM.
L.Q. 269, 290–91 (1997) (“Since marriage and the modern American family still serve a valuable
social, legal, economic, and institutional function, the underlying public policy of most states
continues to promote marriage and discourage divorce unless the parties comply with the
required statutory guidelines for divorce.”); Note, Interlocutory Decrees of Divorce, 56 COLUM.
L. REV. 228, 228 (1956) (“It is the policy of all states to encourage the continuance of the marital
state and to discourage divorces.”).
150. See JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, & INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 291
(1994) (noting that, since 1969, all state reforms related to marriage dissolution “have generally
made divorce easier to obtain”).
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divorce.151 Previously, married couples could not obtain a divorce
unless one of the parties could prove one of several fault-based
grounds, including adultery, desertion, and cruelty.152 But the shift
away from requiring fault was necessary—somewhat ironically—to
promote marriage.153 With the sexual revolution, the stigma that
accompanied cohabitation without marriage was greatly eroded, so
much so that couples faced an increasing temptation to elect this more
informal living situation.154 After all, the more difficult it is to extricate
oneself from marriage, the greater the temptation to simply
cohabitate.155 Judge Richard A. Posner explains that “[t]he more costly
a mistake is, the less likely it is to be committed; and a mistake in
choosing a spouse is more costly in a system that forbids divorce (or
makes it very difficult) than in one that permits it.”156 In other words,
when obtaining divorce becomes too difficult, another example of a
prisoner’s dilemma arises, one that would encourage couples not to
marry and instead elect a more informal living arrangement. To avoid
that likelihood, the states made divorce easier to obtain, thus providing
more incentive for couples to avoid such temptations and opt for a
formal marriage.157

151. Rebecca E. Silberbogen, Does the Dissolution of Covenant Marriages Mirror Common
Law England’s Subordination of Women?, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207, 224 (1998)
(“Since the introduction of no-fault divorce, divorces are easier to obtain . . . .”).
152. See generally Adriaen M. Morse Jr., Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility
in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605 (1996) (arguing for “re-injecting some elements of
fault into the process of marital dissolution”).
153. RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN
SOCIETY 571–72 (1988) (describing no-fault divorce as resulting from “wide-sweeping
liberalization of attitudes toward many institutions and forms of behavior that was characteristic
of the 1960s and 1970s”).
154. See Maggie Gallagher & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, End No-Fault Divorce?, FIRST
THINGS (Aug. 1997), https://www.firstthings.com/article/1997/08/end-no-fault-divorce#print
[https://perma.cc/8UHH-YQBL] (“The states adopted no-fault divorce laws in the 1970s in an
effort to bring legal norms into closer conformity with the more permissive extralegal norms.”).
As Whitehead explains, “[t]he divorce revolution was a cultural rather than legal phenomenon.
It grew out of a historic transformation in ideas and practices regarding sex, marriage, and
parenthood.” Id.
155. See Antony W. Dnes, Cohabitation and Marriage, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 118, 129 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002) (“[T]he
growth in cohabitation may be nothing more than a rational response to rather messy marital
laws.”).
156. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 5.2, at 165 (9th ed. 2014).
157. See Gallagher & Whitehead, supra note 154, at 28 (“For a generation so worried and
confused, the impact of fault law is more likely to discourage marriage than encourage it.”); see
also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9,
13 (1990) (noting how fault-based divorced imposed “costs on divorce”).
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Lowering the restrictions on divorce offers one additional
benefit—it helps ensure that those desiring to end their relationship
actually go through the formal process of obtaining a divorce, rather
than simply dividing up the property themselves and going their
separate ways. In this limited sense (that is, when the options are either
desertion or divorce), the law does wish to encourage divorce.158 After
all, doing so protects not only the parties themselves, but the parties’
subsequent spouses, all of which helps safeguard the state’s interest in
protecting its citizens from economic and social harm.
A. Protections for Former Spouses
Marriage is often analogized to a business partnership and,
correspondingly, divorce to a partnership dissolution proceeding.159
Such an analogy, however, is far from perfect given that there are
crucial differences between business structures and marital unions. As
Posner points out, the dissolution of a marriage is unlike that of a
business partnership because “the division of the marital income may
not be determined by the relative value of each spouse’s
contribution.”160 In a marriage, “each may derive utility from the
consumption expenditures of the other.”161 Accordingly, divorce
proceedings contain a number of difficulties not present in proceedings
to divide a partnership:
When a conventional partnership is dissolved, the assets of the
partnership must be distributed among the partners, and it is the same
with marriage. But determining the spouses’ respective shares of the
assets acquired by the household during the marriage is difficult. If
the wife has had very little market income, all or most of the
household’s tangible assets will have been bought with the husband’s
money. Yet his earning capacity may owe much to her efforts. She
may have supported him while he was a student in law school or

158. See Hill v. Hill, 142 P.2d 417, 422 (Cal. 1943) (“[P]ublic policy does not discourage
divorce where the relations between husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of
matrimony have been utterly destroyed.”).
159. See Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on
Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 879, 902 (1988) (“Thus, a business partnership is analogous to modern
marriage in which each spouse has the right to dissolve at will.”); Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce:
Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 554 (1990) (“[C]ourts and
legislatures analogize marriage to partnership.”).
160. POSNER, supra note 156, § 5.1, at 161; see also Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony,
77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 35 (1989) (“The complete elimination of alimony probably alone renders the
partnership model unacceptable.”).
161. POSNER, supra note 156, § 5.1, at 161.
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medical school, reducing her own consumption and also forgoing
opportunities to increase her own earning capacity through advanced
training.162

Despite these inherent difficulties, the courts strive to insure that the
marital property is divided both equitably and in a way that
“‘compensate[s]’ both parties to a marriage for their respective
contributions.”163
In fact, the very structure of divorce proceedings aims to ensure
that the rights and benefits of each former spouse are adequately
protected. Two facets of divorce law in particular warrant discussion
here: first, the law’s refusal to sanction informal or common law
divorce, and second, the court’s insistence on independently reviewing
settlement agreements to ensure that both parties are being treated
equitably.
1. The Absence of Common Law Divorce. Although a handful of
states permit couples to wed informally, without any requirement that
they obtain a marriage license or hold a marriage ceremony,164 no state
permits such informality when it comes to divorce. Instead, in an
attempt to safeguard the economic interests of the divorcing parties,
states require strict adherence to both the substantive and procedural
dictates of that state’s divorce laws.165 So while marriage can sometimes
be created by informal means, no marriage can be dissolved without
the judicial system playing at least some role in the process.
Common law marriage is a means of obtaining the legal
protections of marriage without going through the strictures of the
formal marriage process. Common law marriage merely requires that
the couple intend to be married, have the legal capacity to wed,
exchange words with one another to that effect, and, in many states,
both cohabitate and hold themselves out to the community as a
married couple.166 Although this practice was historically justified by

162. Id. § 5.3, at 168.
163. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 721, 748 (1993).
164. See generally GORAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR
COHABITATION (2008) (describing common law unions that lack the formalities of traditional
marriage).
165. See, e.g., Kergosien v. Kergosien, 471 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (Miss. 1985) (“Divorce is a
creature of statute . . . . It is a statutory act and the statutes must be strictly followed as they are
in derogation of the common law.”).
166. See CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 300 (Robert E. Emery
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the fact that people living in rural, isolated areas of the United States
might not have access to the “civil and religious authorities” required
for a ceremonial marriage,167 it is now justified by a need to protect the
parties to the marriage. Common law marriage protects the parties’
expectations that their conduct effectuated a valid marriage, thus
securing the benefits and protections that flow from marriage.168 It also
protects “those members of society who can least afford to give up any
part of the limited protections the law currently affords them.”169
Specifically, it protects “the poor, women, children, and members of
minority groups”170 who might otherwise be at the mercy of a
cohabitating partner who, for a variety of reasons, refuses to engage in
a formal marriage ceremony.171
In contrast to common law marriage, no state permits couples to
dissolve a marriage by informal means.172 Nor does any state appear to
be moving in that direction,173 which is a somewhat telling omission
given the increasing amount of control states have given married
couples over the terms of their marriage. As Professor Theodore F.
Haas explains, “[p]rivate ordering of marital and postmarital
relationships generally has been accepted with respect to certain
incidents of those relationships—ownership of property and, to a lesser

ed., 2013); LIND, supra note 164, at 187 (“A cornerstone in the Western concept of marriage is
the requirement that the parties possess the legal capacity to marry.”).
167. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 831 A.2d 1269, 1279 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2003). As one court noted, “[t]he covered wagon days are over. In this county no person lives,
who cannot in some manner easily reach the county courthouse and partake of the beneficence
of those who are by law endowed with the privilege authorizing and conducting the marriage
ceremony.” In re Estate of Soeder, 220 N.E.2d 547, 562 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966).
168. See Kathryn S. Vaughn, The Recent Changes to the Texas Informal Marriage Statute:
Limitation or Abolition of Common-Law Marriage?, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 1131, 1140–41 (1991)
(arguing that common law marriage protects the parties’ expectation of marriage).
169. Id. at 1141.
170. Id.; see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal To Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 779 (1996) (advocating for common law marriage on the basis that
“it protects the interests of women, especially poor women and women of color”).
171. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 957, 964 (2000) (noting that one of the policies underlying common law marriage is “that
the law should protect innocent women from the whims and contrivances of irresponsible or
rakish men”).
172. See Haas, supra note 159, at 881 n.13 (“[S]uch a method of divorcing is unknown to
Anglo-American law.”); Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Litem
in Child Custody Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond Recognition, 6
GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 287 n.156 (1998) (“There is no such thing as ‘common law divorce.’”).
173. See Haas, supra note 159, at 881 n.13 (“There is no readily discernible trend either toward
the reinstitution of common law marriage or toward the institution of common law divorce.”).
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extent, support. However, divorce itself—the change of marital
status—has remained a matter of public rather than private
ordering.”174 Even common law marriages can only be dissolved by a
formal divorce. “If there is a valid common law marriage, it cannot
thereafter be dissolved except in the same manner as a valid
ceremonial marriage—the parties themselves, for instance, cannot
dissolve it by an agreement to do so, or by a denial that it occurred.”175
The courts are so opposed to the notion of common law divorce
that many have outright rejected any argument that would
approximate recognition of common law divorce. For instance, in In re
Marriage of Brooks,176 Harry and Maureen Brooks married in 1950,
separated in 1965, and officially divorced in 1978.177 During the divorce
proceedings, Harry objected to the court’s classifying as “marital
property” the property he had acquired after their separation.178 The
court, however, rejected this argument, writing that “Harry’s
suggestion that the date of the parties’ separation should be used as the
termination date of Maureen’s marital property rights is baseless. For
us to hold that a de facto termination extinguishes marital property
rights would create, in effect, ‘common law divorce.’”179 According to
the court, “[l]aw and policy will not support such a result.”180
Such cases offer a glimpse into the reasoning behind the law’s
refusal to sanction common law divorce. Aside from the enormous
evidentiary benefit of obtaining a formal divorce decree, public policy
demands that divorces play out under the supervision of a court of law
to ensure that each spouse’s contributions to the marriage are fully
taken into account and fairly compensated. As discussed in greater
detail below, family law is generally reluctant to allow divorcing
couples to make settlement agreements on their own—as they would
have to do in a common law divorce—because, “[d]espite the
resemblance that marriage bears to a business partnership, the marital
relationship is not . . . an unalloyed example of free-market
principles.”181 Courts recognize that people in an emotional
174. Id. at 880.
175. Chivers v. Couch Motor Lines, Inc., 159 So. 2d 544, 550 (La. 1964).
176. In re Marriage of Brooks, 486 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
177. Id. at 269.
178. Id. at 271.
179. Id. at 272.
180. Id.; accord In re Marriage of Morris, 640 N.E.2d 344, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
181. POSNER, supra note 156, § 5.2, at 164; see also Louis E. Wolcher, “The Enchantress” and
Karl Polanyi’s Social Theory, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1261 (1990) (“Marriage in its typical form is
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relationship are not “dealing at arm’s length,” so the presence of the
court is warranted to help safeguard the economic interests of the two
parties.182 If we return to the prisoner’s dilemma, it becomes clear that
states understand that giving couples the option of informal divorce
incentivizes behavior that leads to situations where one or both parties
is economically harmed. Such harm, in turn, compromises the state’s
interest in safeguarding the health and wellbeing of its citizens. States
therefore refuse to sanction common law divorce, making it more likely
that couples who wish to dissolve their marriage will involve the state
in that process, even if only to protect their own economic interests.
2. Review of Settlement Agreements. In general, courts view all
domestic agreements with some degree of skepticism.183 When it comes
to prenuptial agreements, for example, courts routinely review them
for unconscionability, require the parties to disclose the nature and
extent of their assets before entering into such agreements, and may
even set aside such agreements when the circumstances of the parties
have changed so drastically as to render application of the agreement
inequitable.184 Thus, although prenuptial agreements “must adhere to
the normal rules of contract,”185 such agreements “remain more
vulnerable to attack than commercial contracts because of special
standards that govern their enforcement.”186
Concerned with protecting the rights and benefits of divorcing
spouses, courts have treated settlement agreements in a similar fashion.
As an initial matter, courts prefer that divorcing couples come to an
agreement on their own regarding the terms of the divorce.187 After all,
if the parties can themselves agree, then the divorce is less likely to be
arguably one of the most emotional and relational, and least rational and individualistic, of all
human transactions.”).
182. See infra notes 313–19 and accompanying text.
183. See Brian Bix, Domestic Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1753, 1771 (2007) (“The law
has always been skeptical of contracts between intimates . . . .”).
184. See Brod, supra note 143, at 254, 260.
185. Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 887, 898 (1997).
186. Id.; see also Recent Developments, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (1991) (“In general,
state courts have refused to treat prenuptial agreements like other contracts, and have enforced
them only if they meet local tests of procedural and substantive fairness.”).
187. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender in the Law: Revaluing the
Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 14 (2008) (“Generally, courts encourage divorcing
couples individually to craft separation agreements regarding the incidents of divorce (except
agreements involving child support, visitation and custody) . . . .”); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(e) (NAT’L. CONFERENCE OF COMM’R ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1970).
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acrimonious. Additionally, the final product is more likely to reflect
the true preferences of the parties than would an adjudicated result.188
Still, courts recognize the possibility of overreaching and even
coercion, and do not give couples carte blanche when it comes to such
agreements. Instead, “[a]t the final hearing most jurisdictions require
the judge to review settlement agreements for unfairness or
unconscionability.”189 As Professor Sally Burnett Sharp explains:
[I]t is commonly said that a settlement agreement, like any other
contract, must be free from any fraud, duress, undue influence, or
overreaching of any kind. Most states, however, impose as an
additional safeguard the requirement that an agreement be submitted
to a court for its approval and that it cannot be merged or
incorporated into the final decree without such approval. Judicial
approval, at least in theory, will be withheld unless the court finds that
the proposed agreement is equitable, or fair and reasonable, or not
unconscionable.190

Although there is some debate about just how meaningful these
protections really are,191 their existence nonetheless points to the law’s
awareness of the harm that can result from a lack of judicial oversight.
As one court wrote, “an agreement in anticipation of divorce is not the
same as any ordinary contract. [Although] [p]ublic policy favors parties
settling their own disputes in a divorce . . . the family court has a
statutorily authorized role . . . [in] assur[ing] a fair and equitable
dissolution of the state-sanctioned institution of marriage.”192
Courts take this role so seriously that, even when both sides are
represented by counsel, the court retains the right to set aside a

188. See generally Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994) (advocating a more critical approach for
evaluating the merits of settlements).
189. Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom To Contract at Divorce: A Mask for
Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1239 (1999).
190. Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution
on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1407 (1984).
191. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethics of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493,
569 (1989) (“R]eview of divorce agreements often has been perfunctory. Evidence of patent
misconduct, such as fraud or concealment, is generally necessary to attract judicial
intervention.”); Sharp, supra note 190, at 1407 (“[J]udicial review requirements as currently
applied by courts fail in any event to provide a meaningful review for either substantive or
procedural fairness.”); see also Bryan, supra note 189, at 1238–39 (noting that “[w]hat review does
occur seems directed more to whether the parties voluntarily agreed to the settlement than to the
settlement’s substance”).
192. Pouech v. Pouech, 904 A.2d 70, 77–78 (Vt. 2006).

HIGDON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

9/25/2017 11:59 AM

POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE

113

settlement agreement that it deems inequitable to one of the parties.
For example, in Bellow v. Bellow,193 the court set aside a settlement
agreement that failed to refer to a $10,000 account that the husband
had withdrawn, incorrectly classified a jointly owned apartment as the
separate property of the husband, and estimated the husband’s income
to be $30,000 when it was in fact $150,000.194 In so ruling, the court
noted that “[i]n reaching our decision we are aware the plaintiff had
the benefit of able counsel all through the proceedings [and] [w]e are
reluctant to overturn the property settlement voluntarily entered into
. . . . Nevertheless, we find there is evidence to support the judgment of
the trial court,” which had determined that the settlement agreement
leads to an “inequitable result.”195
Taken together, the absence of common law divorce and the
requisite judicial review for settlement agreements reveal that divorce
is an essential legal tool for the state’s protection of former spouses.
Moreover, these mechanisms also serve as an incentive to participate
in the formal divorce process in the first place—individuals who
question whether they are leaving the marriage with everything to
which they are entitled would invoke the protections of the court to
obtain greater assurances on that front and an enforceable order to that
effect. In other words, that divorce is a legal option provides an
incentive to ignore thoughts of an informal settlement and instead elect
to pursue a formal divorce in the hopes of achieving a more personally
beneficial outcome.
B. Protections for Future Spouses
Divorce protects subsequent spouses from the ever-present
possibility of desertion, which can harm subsequent spouses as much
as it does deserted spouses. For while no state permits common law
divorce, nothing prevents a married couple from simply going their
separate ways without officially divorcing. This option is often dubbed
“the poor man’s divorce,”196 given its appeal to those for whom a
divorce proceeding is simply too costly:
Historically, the cost of lawyers and court fees, the bewildering

193. Bellow v. Bellow, 352 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
194. Id. at 429.
195. Id. at 432.
196. Sidney B. Jacoby, Legal Aid to the Poor, 53 HARV. L. REV. 940, 957 (1940) (“[D]esertion
is called in popular speech the ‘poor man’s divorce’ due to the practical inability of many poor
persons to obtain a divorce.”).
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jargon of “complaints” and “cross-complaints,” the time-consuming
and seemingly complex legal process, and the popular association of
courts with crime, have served to dissuaded the poor from seeking
legal divorce. At the point of breakup it often seems much easier
simply to separate—or for the man to desert—than go through the
hassles and traumas of legal divorce.197

To put it more simply, “owing to strained finances and a lack of legal
assistance,” some individuals “often forgo divorce and dissolve their
marriages informally.”198
Given the harms that can befall an individual whose marriage ends
without an adjudication of the spouses’ respective rights and
obligations, desertion is an undesirable way to effectuate separation.199
The law therefore actively attempts to encourage formal divorce,200 and
one of the most powerful incentives provided by the law is the rule that
a person can only have one spouse at a time.201 Parties may informally
separate, but once either of them wishes to remarry, he or she must
obtain a divorce from the first spouse. “Going through the formal
divorce process is a condition precedent to the taking of a second wife
or husband.”202
Despite this requirement, “a significant segment of our society
utilizes desertion as a means of dissolving marriages,”203 and some of
those individuals go on to marry someone else. This illegal second
marriage presents a tangible problem for the subsequent spouses. As
one commentator points out, “the real problem develops when . . . they
decide to remarry and want to make the second marriage work.”204
Without legally dissolving the first marriage, the second marriage is

197. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW
194 (1981) (“Thus common-law divorce has always been most prevalent among poverty
subcultures.”).
198. Id. at 206.
199. See Timothy Follett, In re The Marriage of Ramirez: Sex Lies, and California’s
Annulment for Fraud Based on Fidelity, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 433, 455 (2013) (“[D]ivorce
proceedings protect marriage by recognizing that the marriage existed and then enforcing the
rights and obligations of the parties that chose to enter into the marriage contract.”).
200. See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL.
L. REV. 813, 832 (2000) (“Because wives were dependent upon their husbands for support,
abandoned women would have been left destitute without ex parte divorces.”).
201. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
202. Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809, 815 (W. Va. 1990).
203. Taylor, supra note 25, at 479.
204. WEITZMAN, supra note 197, at 194.
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invalid,205 rendering the parties to the subsequent marriage bereft of
any spousal protections. And while the bigamous party would be
exposed to the dangers of potential criminal liability,206 it is that party’s
second spouse who suffers the real harms. “The invalid marriage
disqualifies the second spouse from the default protection marriage
provides a (legitimate) surviving spouse, while the [first,] lawful
marriage simultaneously protects the valid marriage partner’s interest
and prevents the bigamous partner from profiting from the illegitimacy
of the marriage.”207
Given the harms that accrue to subsequent, legally invalid spouses,
the courts have developed three doctrines to protect them: the
subsequent marriage presumption, the marriage by estoppel doctrine,
and the putative spouse doctrine. As will be described in the next
sections, each doctrine is used to safeguard the protections that would
have naturally accrued had the bigamous spouse obtained a valid
divorce prior to the second marriage.
1. Subsequent Marriage Presumption. Suppose that Henry
married Catherine but subsequently moved out and married Anne.208
Unhappy with Anne, he deserted her and married Jane. At no point
does he file for divorce from either Catherine or Anne. Henry then
dies, leaving a rather large fortune. Not surprisingly, Catherine, Anne,
and Jane all come forward claiming to be Henry’s wife. A problem thus
arises—who is Henry’s legal wife? Many would assume the answer to
be Catherine. After all, until he divorced his first wife, all subsequent
“marriages” would be void. In most instances, however, the correct
response would be just the opposite—Jane would prevail.
Jane would owe her victory to what is frequently described as “the
strongest presumption[] in the law”209—namely, the subsequent or lastin-time marriage presumption. Using this presumption, courts presume
205. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 66 So. 2d 135, 139 (Ala. 1953) (“A woman can have but one lawful
husband living, and so long as he is alive and the marriage bond remains in full force, all her
subsequent marriages, whether meretricious or founded in mistake and at the time supposed to
be lawful, are utterly null and void.”).
206. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
207. Lynne Marie Kohm, Why Marriage is Still the Best Default in Estate Planning Conflicts,
117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1219, 1231 (2013).
208. In all the hypotheticals contained in this Article, the parties take their names from those
involved in the fascinating history of Henry VIII and his six wives. See generally ALISON WEIR,
THE SIX WIVES OF HENRY VIII (1991).
209. Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Vaughan v. Vaughan, 195
Miss. 463, 471 (1943) (describing the presumption as “one of the strongest known to the law”).
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“that any former marriage was terminated by death, annulment, or
divorce”210 and assume that a person’s most recent marriage is the one
that is legally valid. The burden then shifts to the former spouse to
prove that their marriage was never legally terminated.211
What might sound like a rather easy burden to meet is nearly
impossible. After all, “a prior spouse will only be able to rebut this lastin-time marriage presumption by searching all of the divorce records
where the deceased spouse resided—or could have resided—in order
to prove that no divorce decree was ever granted to the deceased
spouse.”212 As one court described the required burden of proof,
“every reasonable possibility of validity must be negatived, and . . . the
evidence to overcome the presumption of validity of the subsequent
marriage must be clear, strong, and satisfactory and so persuasive as to
leave no room for reasonable doubt.”213
An illustration of this onerous burden can be found in the 1951
case of United States v. Burns.214 Lillie Harris Burns married Elisha
Burns in Mississippi in 1928, but after the couple moved to Missouri,
Elisha left her for another woman, Rosie Lee Liverson.215 Lillie Harris
then moved to Arkansas, never divorced Elisha, and likewise never
received notice that he had filed for divorce from her.216 Nonetheless,
Elisha and Rosie Lee married in 1943.217 When Elisha died, both
women came forward claiming to be Elisha’s surviving spouse in order
to obtain the proceeds of his insurance policy.218 The court applied the
subsequent marriage presumption, stating that the burden was on Lillie
(as the first-in-time spouse) “to prove by clear and decisive evidence

210. Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law, Husband & Wife, 49 SMU L. REV. 1015, 1018 n.17
(1996).
211. See Parker v. Am. Lumber Co., 56 S.E.2d 214, 216 (Va. 1949) (“[T]he second marriage is
presumed valid; such presumption is stronger than and overcomes the presumption of the
continuance of the first marriage, so that a person who attacks a second marriage has the burden
of producing evidence of its invalidity.”).
212. Peter Nash Swisher & Melanie Diana Jones, The Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption, 29
FAM. L.Q. 409, 410 n.3 (1995) (emphasis added).
213. Harper v. Dupree, 345 P.2d 644, 647 (Kan. 1959) (“In other words, it is said that the
burden of proving that a divorce has not been granted to either party to a former marriage is
substantial and is not met by proof of facts from which mere inferences may be drawn.”).
214. United States v. Burns, 95 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Ark. 1951).
215. Id. at 629.
216. Id.
217. Id. Lillie likewise remarried a man named Fred Hamilton, but several years after their
marriage, he learned of Elisha and left Lille. Id.
218. Id.
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that neither party had obtained a divorce.”219 Although the court
recognized the difficulty imposed by such a burden, which essentially
required Lillie “to prove a negative,”220 it nonetheless ruled that the
high burden was necessary “to overcome the sacred and stalwart
presumption protecting the marriage state.”221 Lillie attempted to
satisfy her burden by producing “certificates from the clerks of
counties where Elisha was supposed to have lived since the date of her
marriage to him, showing that by proper search of the records no
record was found of any divorce granted to either Elisha Burns or Lillie
Harris Burns during his lifetime.”222 But unfortunately for Lillie, she
neglected to search one particular county. The court pointed out that
“it is in evidence that after Elisha left [Lillie] he lived in St. Francis
County, Arkansas, and no certificate was furnished for that county.”223
For that reason, Lillie’s claim failed, and she was denied the proceeds
of Elisha’s insurance policy.224
In essence, the subsequent marriage presumption operates by
presuming a divorce, when in fact, one likely never occurred. There are
several policy-based motivations underlying this presumption, the first
of which is to protect the family,225 particularly the children of the
various relationships. For instance, looking back at the earlier
hypothetical, assume that Henry had one child each with Catherine,
Anne, and Jane. To treat his marriage to Catherine as the only valid
marriage would mean that the children borne to Anne and Jane would
be considered nonmarital or—to use the outdated, more pejorative
term—illegitimate. On the contrary, to assume that each subsequent
marriage was instead valid, each child would be considered
legitimate.226 Because distinctions based on legitimacy have

219. Id. at 630 (citing Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Harris, 120 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Ark. 1938)).
220. Id.; see also Swisher & Jones, supra note 212, at 430 n.170 (“It is generally recognized
that in many fact situations these elements place a heavy, sometimes an impossible, burden on
the attacker to prove two negatives—no death and no divorce.”).
221. Burns, 95 F. Supp. at 630.
222. Id. at 629.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 630 (“Having failed to produce the required quality of evidence she must be
deemed to have failed to make good her claim.”).
225. See Tatum v. Tatum, 201 F.2d 401, 406 (9th Cir. 1957) (noting that one of the policy
rationales for the presumption is “to protect and strengthen the social and moral standards of the
community”).
226. See, e.g., Fowler v. Tex. Expl. Co., 290 S.W. 818, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (noting that
the presumption “should always be indulged [but] especially when such presumption is necessary
to protect the legitimacy of children”).
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increasingly died away, such protection may seem less important
today.227 Nonetheless, legitimacy remains one of the historic
justifications for the presumption.
A second, more important motivation is the degree to which the
subsequent marriage presumption protects the parties’ expectations
and the subsequent spouses’ welfare. The deceased likely considered
his most recent spouse his actual spouse, to whom he would confer all
the accompanying rights and benefits of marriage.228
Last is the states’ interest in “protecting apparent spouses in
economically vulnerable positions from becoming welfare
recipients.”229 As noted earlier, numerous benefits attend marriage.230
Were it not for the subsequent marriage presumption, individuals like
Jane would be denied all those protections and benefits simply because
she had the misfortune of marrying someone who failed to divorce a
previous spouse. And those previous spouses (Catherine and Anne in
our hypothetical) are likely much less in need of protection because
they have—ostensibly, at least—been living without Henry for some
time.231
Given these “strong and persuasive underlying public policy
rationales,” a vast majority of jurisdictions continue to recognize and
apply the subsequent marriage protection as a means of safeguarding
the protections that would otherwise flow from legal divorce.232
2. Marriage by Estoppel. Suppose instead that Henry only had one
wife, Catherine, but she was previously married to someone else,
Arthur.233 Suppose further that, before she even met Henry, Catherine
227. See Swisher & Jones, supra note 212, at 414.
228. See, e.g., Rainer v. Snider, 369 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (“The presumption
rests upon strong social policies which give effect to the expectations of the parties.”);
McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, 21 S.E.2d 761, 765 (Va. 1945) (“While it is true, however, that
cohabitation and repute do not constitute marriage, they do constitute strong evidence tending to
raise a presumption of marriage, and the burden is on him who denies the marriage to offer
countervailing evidence.”).
229. See Swisher & Jones, supra note 212, at 414.
230. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
231. See RANDY FRANCES KANDEL, FAMILY LAW: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 27
(2000) (“The first spouse, whether validly divorced or not, has been separated from the decedent
socially and financially for an extended time, has survived in other ways, and is less likely to be
expecting such benefits.”).
232. See Swisher & Jones, supra note 212, at 414–15 (describing the number of jurisdictions
as “overwhelming”).
233. Interestingly enough, Henry VIII’s first wife, Catherine of Aragon, was indeed
previously married to Arthur, Henry VIII’s older brother. It was Arthur who was originally heir
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divorced Arthur, but the divorce was invalid for some reason. So when
Henry files for divorce from Catherine, she counters that the two were
never legally married, citing the fact that her previous marriage to
Arthur was never properly dissolved. Many people would likely
assume that Catherine’s argument would prevail—a person can only
have one spouse at a time and Catherine’s previous marriage remains
legally in effect. Instead, Henry would likely prevail by using the
doctrine of marriage by estoppel.
Traditionally, equitable estoppel requires “(1) action or nonaction
[by one person] which induces (2) reliance by another (3) to his
detriment.”234 In cases like Catherine’s, those elements would rarely be
satisfied. To the extent that Catherine’s invalid divorce would operate
as a detriment to her, it is one that she herself created—Henry played
no role. In fact, the only role Henry played was to enter into a
purported marriage with Catherine. Traditional equitable estoppel
actually allows individuals like Henry to rely on a prior invalid divorce
to divest individuals like Catherine of all the rights they thought they
had acquired in the subsequent marriage.
Once again recognizing the extreme harm that can result from
reliance on an invalid marriage, family law provides a solution: the
courts apply equitable estoppel differently when one spouse attempts
to rely on a previous, invalid divorce. Marriage by estoppel, as the
doctrine has come to be called, “is unlike classic equitable estoppel in
that it does not focus solely on whether one party has made a
misrepresentation on which the other has reasonably relied.”235
Instead, “[t]he focus is broader and requires a consideration of all of

to the English throne, and he married Catherine when he was just fifteen years of age. When he
unexpectedly died just a few months later, Henry became the heir and, like his brother before
him, took Catherine for his wife. See generally SEAN CUNNINGHAM, PRINCE ARTHUR: THE
TUDOR KING WHO NEVER WAS (2016). Even more interesting is the fact that it was this previous
marriage that provided Henry with the ammunition to ultimately annul his marriage to Catherine.
Specifically, “[s]he was his brother’s wife, and, under ecclesiastical law, their sexual relationship
was considered incest. After Catherine had undergone numerous miscarriages and stillbirths,
Henry became convinced that God was punishing him for his incestuous marriage to her, and he
sought an annulment in 1525.” CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE, supra note 166, at 678.
234. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 491
(1990); see also Homer Clark, Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 70
YALE L.J. 45, 57 (1960) (defining equitable estoppel as a doctrine in which “one who has taken a
position with reference to a transaction and thereby obtained a benefit or brought about a change
of position in the other party to the transaction cannot later take an inconsistent position which
would prejudice the other party”).
235. Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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the circumstances surrounding not only the procurement of the
divorce, but also the conduct of the parties thereafter and the effect of
a declaration of the invalidity of the divorce on others.”236 Stated more
simply, “[a] person may be precluded from attacking the validity of a
foreign divorce decree if, under the circumstances, it would be
inequitable for him to do so.”237
Consider the case of Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss.238 There,
Pennsylvania resident Beverly Lowenschuss divorced her first husband
in 1964 by traveling to Alabama, where she remained only so long as
was necessary to obtain a divorce decree. Because she failed to
establish residency in Alabama, though, her divorce was invalid.239 Not
realizing that she had failed to effectuate a legal divorce, Beverly
returned to Pennsylvania, where she met and married Fred
Lowenschuss.240 The couple eventually had four children together.241
Fred testified that he learned of Beverly’s defective divorce in 1974,
but he also testified that, from that point on, they nonetheless
“continued to live the same way as before.”242 In 1981, Beverly filed for
divorce, but Fred defended by citing Beverly’s invalid Alabama
divorce, arguing that, on that basis, he and Beverly were never legally
married.243 The court refused to allow Fred to even raise the
circumstances of Beverly’s previous divorce.
Even though Fred was not a party to her prior divorce
proceedings, the court ruled that, in light of his conduct, it would be
inequitable for him to raise that defense at this late date. Both parties
“relied in good faith on the Alabama divorce in marrying each other in
1965 and continued to rely on that divorce at minimum until 1974. . . .
Husband conducted himself as a married man for nine years before

236. Id.; see also JOHN DE WITT GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER & ROBIN FRETWELL
WILSON, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 39 (2013) (“It is sufficient, in many cases, that a court
find only that it would be unfair to let a party take advantage of the legal invalidity of a divorce
decree and the invalidity of the subsequent marriage.”).
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 74 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
238. Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
239. Id. at 378 (“Wife spent at most two days in Alabama and does not dispute the fact that
she has never been a bona fide resident of Alabama.”).
240. Id. (“Husband knew that wife was divorced, but denies knowing any of the details
concerning how the divorce was procured.”).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 379. Fred had commenced his own divorce action in 1974, but subsequently
withdrew it when, according to him, he learned of the defective divorce; however, Beverly
testified that it was withdrawn because the two reconciled. Id. at 378–79.
243. Id. at 377.
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1974 and after 1974 he continued to live as he had before.”244
Ultimately, the court found that:
[n]o social purpose will be served by a decision that this marriage
simply does not exist and that wife is still the legal wife of her first
husband and that her four children were born of an illicit relationship.
To hold that husband may now raise this challenge simply in order to
avoid the financial obligations of his marriage would be grossly
inequitable.245

To justify its ruling, the court reiterated the important and protective
function of divorce, writing that “a decision which would allow
husband to avoid his marital obligations at this late juncture would be
completely inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s contemporary
attitude toward divorce, which is grounded in the application of
equitable principles to achieve economic justice and overall fairness
between the parties.”246
3. Putative Marriage. Returning to the first hypothetical, assume
that Anne—Henry’s second wife—defeats the subsequent marriage
presumption to the detriment of Jane—Henry’s third wife. Were that
to happen, one might assume that Jane would be left without any of
the protections of marriage, no better off from a property perspective
than a longtime roommate. Once again, this assumption would prove
incorrect. Family law has one additional weapon in its arsenal to
protect a subsequent spouse who learns that she was never in fact
legally wed: the putative marriage doctrine.247
To understand how it operates, consider the limitations of the two
doctrines discussed above. Both the marriage by estoppel doctrine and
the subsequent marriage presumption conjure up a valid divorce
where, factually, none likely exists. They do so either by presuming the
existence of a valid divorce that cannot easily be disproven248 or, when
faced with evidence of a prior divorce that was clearly invalid, by

244. Id. at 385. The court also noted that there was “no evidence that wife had any knowledge
that her Alabama divorce was invalid and an impediment to a valid Pennsylvania marriage when
she married husband.” Id. Further, “the Alabama judge who granted wife her divorce was later
convicted of representing to out of state residents that they could obtain valid Alabama divorces.”
Id.
245. Id. at 386.
246. Id.
247. See generally Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV.
1 (1985) (detailing the historical evolution of the doctrine and its basic components).
248. See supra Part III.B.1.
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preventing parties from using that divorce as a means of defeating the
validity of their subsequent marriage.249 The putative marriage
doctrine goes one step further in protecting subsequent spouses,
protecting those who entered into a “marriage” in good faith even
where the court cannot create a valid divorce to salvage the subsequent
marriage.
Essentially, the putative marriage doctrine provides the civil
effects of marriage to one who in good faith entered into a marriage
that is later revealed to be invalid.250 In other words, “[a] putative
marriage . . . is a marriage which is in reality null, but which allows the
civil effects of a valid marriage to flow to the party or parties who
contracted it in good faith.”251 The only requirements parties must meet
to avail themselves of this protection is to have had a ceremonial
marriage and to have done so in good faith that the marriage would be
valid—good faith defined as “ignoran[ce] of the cause which prevents
the formation of the marriage or the defects in its celebration which
caused its nullity.”252
Like the subsequent marriage presumption and the marriage by
estoppel doctrine, the putative marriage doctrine is intended to protect
innocent spouses—including mistaken bigamists, who innocently but
erroneously believe that they obtained a valid divorce prior to
remarrying—and promote equity. As one court explained, “[A]
marriage contracted when one spouse is a party to a previously
undissolved marriage is absolutely null; however, equity demands that
innocent persons not be injured through an innocent relationship.”253
As Professor Christopher Blakesley points out, the primary motivation
behind this doctrine is the desire to ensure fairness. “The putative
marriage doctrine is a device developed to ameliorate or correct the
injustice which would occur if civil effects were not allowed to flow to
a party to a null marriage who believes in good faith that he or she is

249. See supra Part.III.B.2.
250. See Monica Hof Wallace, The Pitfalls of a Putative Marriage and the Call for a Putative
Divorce, 64 LA. L. REV. 71, 73 (2003) (“The putative marriage rule provides the proverbial bridge
to civil effects in the event parties fail in their attempt to contract a valid marriage, believing in
good faith they had done so.”).
251. Blakesley, supra note 247, at 6.
252. Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797, 804 (La. 1935) (quoting 1 M. PLANIOL, TRAITÉ
ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, no. 1096 (3d ed.)); see also Saacks v. Saacks, 96-736, p. 6 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 1/28/97); 688 So. 2d 673, 676 (defining “good faith” as “an honest and reasonable belief
that the marriage was valid and that no legal impediment to it existed”).
253. Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826, 842 (W.D. La. 1978).
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validly married.”254 Because “[u]nless some protective or corrective
measure intercedes, the normal civil effects of marriage simply do not
flow from a marriage which is null.”255
The 2004 Nevada case of Williams v. Williams is exemplary.256
Richard and Marcie Williams married in 1973 and lived together as
husband and wife for the next twenty-seven years, at which time
Richard learned that Marcie had never divorced her first husband.257
As a result, Richard filed an annulment action to declare his marriage
to Marcie void.258 The case provided Nevada with its first opportunity
to adopt the putative spouse doctrine:
We have not previously considered the putative spouse doctrine, but
we are persuaded by the rationale of our sister states that public
policy supports adopting the doctrine in Nevada. Fairness and equity
favor recognizing putative spouses when parties enter into a marriage
ceremony in good faith and without knowledge that there is a factual
or legal impediment to their marriage. . . . As a majority of our sister
states have recognized, the sanctity of marriage is not undermined,
but rather enhanced, by the recognition of the putative spouse
doctrine. We therefore adopt the doctrine in Nevada.259

Applying the doctrine to the case at hand, the court had little difficulty
finding that a ceremonial marriage had taken place.260
A difficulty arose, however, in gauging whether Marcie had
entered into the marriage in good faith. Her claim was merely “that in
1971, she ran into [her first husband] at a Reno bus station, where he
specifically told her that they were divorced and he was living with

254. Blakesley, supra note 247, at 6.
255. Id. at 4; see also Wallace, supra note 250, at 72–73 (“By the general rule, parties who do
not enter into a valid marriage create no civil contract and therefore are afforded no rights and
duties of that marriage.”).
256. Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam).
257. Id. at 1126.
258. Id. (“Richard testified that had he known Marcie was still married, he would not have
married her.”).
259. Id. at 1128. In reaching this conclusion, the court further noted:
[The doctrine does not] conflict with Nevada’s policy [of] refusing to recognize
common-law marriages or palimony suits [because, in situations involving] the putative
spouse doctrine, the parties have actually attempted to enter into a formal relationship
with the solemnization of a marriage ceremony, a missing element in common-law
marriages and palimony suits.
Id.
260. Id. (“The district court found that the parties obtained a license and participated in a
marriage ceremony on August 26, 1973, in Verdi, Nevada.”).
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another woman.”261 Richard argued that such reliance was
unreasonable given that she had never been served with divorce
papers, and, at the very least, she had a duty to inquire further into the
existence of the “divorce” before marrying again.262 The court rejected
Richard’s arguments and ruled in Marcie’s favor, noting at the outset
that “[g]ood faith is presumed” and that “[t]he party asserting lack of
good faith has the burden of proving bad faith.”263 Ultimately, the court
ruled that the lower court was within its discretion in finding that
Marcie had entered into the marriage in good faith given that
“substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that Marcie
did not act unreasonably in relying upon Allmaras’ representations.
The record reflects no reason for Marcie to have disbelieved him and,
thus, no reason to have investigated the truth of his representations.”264
In ruling as it did, the court also made note of Marcie’s financial
circumstances:
During the 27 years that the parties believed themselves to be
married, Marcie was a homemaker and a mother. From 1981 to 1999,
Marcie was a licensed child-care provider for six children. During that
time, she earned $460 a week. At trial, Marcie had a certificate of
General Educational Development (G.E.D.) and earned $8.50 an
hour at a retirement home. She was 63 years old and lived with her
daughter because she could not afford to live on her own. . . .
....
. . . The district court found that Marcie had limited ability to
support herself.265

Implicit in this recitation is the court’s awareness of the degree to which
Marcie would be harmed if forced to walk away from a twenty-sevenyear relationship with no property rights flowing from what she
believed was a valid marriage. By finding that Marcie was a putative
spouse, the property acquired during her marriage to Richard was

261. Id. at 1127.
262. Id. at 1129.
263. Id. at 1128; see also Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587, 592 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (“[G]ood
faith is presumed to exist in favor of a party claiming to be a putative spouse who, free of her own
impediment, enters into the marriage and the burden of proving the lack of good faith is upon the
party attacking the marriage.”).
264. Williams, 97 P.3d at 1129. The court then noted that “[a]lthough older case law suggests
that a party cannot rely on a former spouse’s representation of divorce, more recent cases indicate
this is just a factor for the judge to consider in determining good faith.” Id.
265. Id. at 1127.
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labeled quasi-community property and divided equally between
them.266
In sum, when two people enter into a marriage, but one of those
individuals is still legally married to someone else, the results can be
devastating for the subsequent spouse who later learns that his
“marriage”—and all the accompanying protections he thought he
enjoyed—never legally existed. The state is likewise harmed because it
“becomes responsible for supporting a spouse if the divorce settlement
does not provide financial security.”267 The three doctrines discussed
above were developed to help avoid such harms. These “alternative
constructs and regulations are used to protect vulnerable parties in
long-term cohabitant relationships.”268
Most importantly, each of those doctrines derive their
effectiveness from the fact that the law currently only allows a person
to have one spouse at any given time. As the next section discusses,
should that numerical limitation go away, new harms would emerge,
and these doctrines would be powerless to stop them.
IV. THE EX ANTE COSTS OF LEGALIZING POLYGAMY
This Article argues that, even assuming that the right to marry did
include plural marriage, the state’s interest in promoting divorce
among separating couples is nonetheless a compelling justification
requiring nothing short of a complete ban on polygamy. As noted in
the Introduction, there are times when the law attempts to neutralize
the harmful results that can arise from prisoner’s dilemmas by
discouraging cooperation between “prisoners.” The law of divorce is
one such example. Specifically, to prevent spouses from cooperating in
a scheme wherein they eschew divorce in favor of informal separation,
the law provides a number of inducements directed at both parties,
increasing the likelihood that at least one of them will defect from any
such scheme and instead opt to formally dissolve the marriage.269 As
explained more fully below, legalizing polygamy would remove one of
266. Id. at 1129–30 (“Community property states that recognize the putative spouse doctrine
apply community property principles to the division of property, including determinations of what
constitutes community and separate property. . . . We agree with this reasoning.”).
267. Carolyn Counce, Family Law—Cary v. Cary: Antenuptial Agreements Waiving or
Limiting Alimony in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1997).
268. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form:
Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 453
(2013) (noting alternatives to traditional common law marriage).
269. See infra Part IV.A.
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the strongest incentives—the threat of a bigamy prosecution—for
married couples to formally divorce, thus making formal divorce less
likely among separating couples and consequently undermining the
various protections the law of divorce has been carefully crafted to
safeguard.
One might ask why contemporary law should be concerned with
polygamy given that the practice of plural marriage is, and always has
been, banned throughout the country. The answer is that, regardless of
its current legal status, plural marriage nonetheless continues to exist
within the United States.270 Such marriages are, of course, legally
invalid and those who practice polygamy are subject to criminal
prosecution.271 Nonetheless, the institution has persevered, and some
argue that the practice is even growing.272 Although the Supreme Court
has upheld these prohibitions in the face of First Amendment
challenges,273 it has never had occasion to address whether a right to
polygamy exists under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Given the recent success of a similar challenge to the
states’ ban on same-sex marriage274 and the fact that, for political
reasons, no state is likely to legalize polygamy in the near future, an
argument that plural marriage falls within the ambit of the
fundamental right to marry is likely the strongest basis at present for
reversing the United States’ longstanding ban on polygamy.
The problem, however, is that even if one could successfully
convince the Court that the right to marry likewise includes the right
to polygamy, the states’ prohibitions on the practice would nonetheless
survive a constitutional challenge so long as a state could demonstrate
that, first, it has a “compelling interest” to justify the restrictions and,
second, that those restrictions do not “unnecessarily burden or restrict
constitutionally protected activity.”275 It is the interest in requiring and
promoting divorce among separating couples that provides the
requisite state interest in justifying an absolute prohibition on
polygamy. After all, as discussed more fully below, even attempts to
distinguish polygamy from bigamy would fail to safeguard this

270. See supra Part I.
271. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 123–38 and accompanying text.
275. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 760 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing strict
scrutiny).
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overriding interest on the part of the state.276
Although other scholars have discussed the impacts of legalizing
polygamy,277 they have done so by focusing exclusively on how the
practice would impact those who affirmatively seek to engage in plural
marriage as that practice is traditionally understood. In contrast, this
Article focuses, not on polygamists, but on sequential bigamists—that
is, those who will marry more than once but never with the intent of
having more than one spouse at a time—and the ex ante consequences
that the legalization of polygamy would have on their marriages.
Looking at polygamy through this lens makes much clearer the dangers
to the state and the necessity of an absolute prohibition.
In developing this argument, this Part first explores the harms that
would accrue if polygamy were legalized, focusing specifically on the
economic harms that legal polygamy would pose to spouses, both
current and subsequent. This Part then addresses some of the possible
distinctions a state might draw to permit “traditional” polygamy yet
prohibit sequential bigamy, arguing that none of those legislative
distinctions would adequately safeguard the state’s interest in
protecting spouses.
A. Legalized Polygamy Undermines the States’ Compelling Interest in
Promoting Divorce Among Separating Spouses
As discussed earlier, formal divorce furthers the state’s interest in
safeguarding the economic well-being of its citizens, including those
who are exiting a marriage and those who may enter into a marriage
with someone who was married before.278 For those reasons, the state
has a strong interest in assuring that all are sufficiently incentivized to
formally divorce and not simply desert the marriage. More specifically,
the state seeks assurances that the separation adequately and fairly
provides for the financial needs of each party, that the parties are
taking from the marriage that to which they are entitled, and that any
children of the marriage are being fully supported and cared for in a
way that is in their best interests.279 And when it comes to the poor, the
276. Requiring that all parties consent to a polygamous marriage, for example, would provide
no assurances that such consent was not coercively obtained. See infra Part IV.B.
277. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Part III.
279. See Stephen Cretney, The Law and the Family – Time for Divorce?, 32 COMMON L.
WORLD REV. 101, 115 (2003) (describing “the arguments for judicial involvement in divorce
proceedings” as including “that the interests of the children need to be protected, that couples
need to be properly informed about the consequences of their actions, and that they may benefit
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state’s interest is particularly acute—the states’ general parens patriae
role of protecting “all individuals of the state who cannot protect
themselves” is coupled with the degree to which divorce can further
erode an individual’s financial stability.280
Attempting to promote divorce, however, is not an easy job for
the state. Even in the most amicable of separations, divorce is
unpleasant. It is emotionally taxing, potentially stigmatizing within
one’s community, and, most significantly, incredibly expensive.
Evidence suggests that among poorer Americans, divorce may be so
expensive that it is essentially unattainable.281 Thus, the incentives that
the state provides are paramount. After all, beyond those who cannot
afford to divorce, the question remains—why would any couple elect
to divorce when they could save themselves a lot of trouble and
expense by simply going their separate ways?
The answer lies in the number of legal incentives that the state has
designed to encourage formal divorce. To begin with, starting a new
life costs money, so those who leave a marriage do not want to do so
empty handed; they would prefer to depart with as close to what they
put into the marriage as they can. Divorce is helpful in that regard as it
offers an adversarial proceeding with a judge who will independently
review any agreement the parties reach. For those reasons, divorce—
despite its less attractive qualities—can seem like the best option when
it comes to helping the parties obtain a better and more equitable
result. Relatedly, many people will view divorce as an attractive option
because, after the marriage is formally dissolved, their ex-spouse
cannot make a claim on any property that they acquire in the future.
Still, such economic incentives are by themselves insufficient to
encourage many people who want to permanently separate to formally
divorce. For those couples who cannot afford a divorce, the propertybased incentives to divorce might not be meaningful.282 The message
that formal divorce proceedings safeguard property interests, for
example, is not likely to compel married couples who do not own any
meaningful property. And even couples who can afford to divorce
from advice and counseling about their personal relationships”).
280. See Griffith, supra note 143, at 331 (noting that an analysis for the state’s parens patriae
power extends beyond children).
281. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
282. See Danaya C. Wright, Untying the Knot: An Analysis of the English Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes Court Records, 1858–1866, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 928–29 (2004)
(hypothesizing that a low number of separation petitions filed by wives indicates an economic
inability to continue the suit).
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might determine that an informal separation agreement would be more
economically advantageous than a formal divorce.
Of course, as noted earlier,283 the law cannot always rely
exclusively on one variety of incentives when it comes to dealing with
prisoner’s dilemmas. Instead, “[t]he Hobbesian Leviathan that we live
under needs not only the hammer of contract to uphold promises, but
also the hammer of mandatory regulation in criminal law, tort law,
contract law, and other areas of law, regulation that says, ‘Thou shalt
not.’”284 Laws prohibiting bigamy provide that necessary second
incentive. When married couples separate, the parties know they
cannot legally marry another person until they first divorce their
previous spouse. This requirement lures even those couples that decide
to informally separate to divorce court once either of them wants to
remarry. And while it is true that bigamy prosecutions remain
relatively rare,285 one must presume that most individuals would rather
not take the chance of being prosecuted for such a crime. This is
particularly true because bigamy is a crime that carries with it quite a
bit of social stigma, even for mere allegations.286 That a conviction is
unlikely is probably little encouragement to those who might publicly
face such charges.
Aside the threat of criminal prosecution, the current rule that no
person may have more than one spouse at any one time also offers
other, more practical incentives. Specifically, the law offers a plethora
of rights and benefits reserved exclusively for those who are legally
283. See supra notes 12–13, 15–18 and accompanying text.
284. Wayne Eastman, Ideology and Formality: The Eternal Golden Snarl, 29 CONN. L. REV.
849, 852 (1997); see also Lynn A. Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1605, 1617 n.38 (2002) (“[M]ost people seem to try to stay within the constraints of tort law and
criminal law, even when a cold calculation of costs and benefits suggests they could profit from
negligent or criminal behavior.”). For instance, the penalties that exist for failing to pay taxes are
necessary in part because “[n]o one wants to pay taxes because the benefits are so diffuse and the
costs are so direct. But everyone may be better off if each person has to pay so that each share
the benefits of schools, roads, and other collective goods.” ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION 133 (rev. ed. 2006).
285. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
“Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 103 (2000) (listing various harms
that flow from unenforced sodomy laws). As Professor Leslie argues, “[a] criminal law, though
not enforced through prosecutions, may still affect society.” Id. Of particular relevance here is
Professor Leslie’s point that unenforced laws impose “the stigma of criminality.” Id. at 112
(quoting JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1970, at 14 (1983)). Presumably, most
non-polygamists would not only be motivated to divorce by the fear of a bigamy prosecution, but
also the stigma that would come from simply being accused of bigamy.
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married.287 The flip side of reserving these benefits for legal spouses is
that one who thinks himself married and thus relies on those
protections would be even more harmed if it is later revealed that the
marriage was invalid.288 Accordingly, even if criminal prohibitions on
bigamy are insufficient to steer married individuals into divorce court
before marrying a second spouse, the financial risk to which they are
exposing their subsequent spouse provides an even more powerful
incentive.
If polygamy were to become legal, however, the current
prohibitions on having more than one spouse would go away, taking
with them the incentives those laws provide for formal divorce.
Instead, unhappily married couples who decide to forgo divorce could
simply remarry without the fear of being prosecuted for bigamy or
having a subsequent marriage be declared void. Accordingly, any
ruling that requires states to recognize polygamy would cause an
increase in plural marriage—both purposeful plural marriage and
sequential polygamy, in which a person is legally married to multiple
people as a result of deciding not to get formally divorced from
“previous” spouses—and the resulting injury would be significant. As
discussed below, for those people who elect to become sequential
polygamists, those harms would be particularly acute, harming both
current and subsequent spouses and, in the process, undermining the
states’ substantial “interest in protecting the financial interests of the
parties at divorce”289
1. Harms to Initial Spouses. For current spouses, the most
significant harms would result from the loss of oversight by the court.
In other words, for those couples that elect to permanently separate
but not divorce, the state would lose its opportunity to ensure that the
couple ends their marriage on terms that are fair and equitable to both
parties. As discussed earlier, the law does not permit common law
divorce, and courts will review any settlement agreement between
divorcing parties for fairness even during formal divorces.290 These
requirements stem from the law’s awareness that, when left to their
own devices, divorcing couples may not act in their own economic self287. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
288. As outlined earlier, the law has fashioned a number of doctrines designed to avoid such
results. See supra Part III.B. But those protections are not guaranteed or necessarily sufficient to
fully protect the subsequent spouse. See infra Part IV.A.2.
289. In re Marriage of Wisth, 754 N.W.2d 254, 254 (2008).
290. See supra Part III.A.
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interest, which creates too great a possibility that agreements between
the parties could be the product of coercion or fraud.291
The removal of the bigamy bar could lead to de facto common law
divorce wherein separating couples would only have, at best, whatever
protections given them in settlement agreements. If the state has no
way of approving these agreements, divorcing parties can be left in a
precarious financial situation without the state’s knowledge or
protection. Hardest hit would be those who were already, while
married, facing financial difficulty.292 Moreover, even fair and equitable
settlement agreements would be less secure without the enforceability
of a formal divorce decree.293
It is true, of course, that simply because a couple does not
immediately divorce does not mean they will never divorce—some
simply wait. Such delays can and will take place regardless of how the
law treats plural marriage. But if polygamy is legalized, such a delay
could be quite costly because one of the spouses could legally remarry
before divorcing their first spouse.
Consider the following hypothetical: Henry marries Catherine and
the two acquire significant marital property. Henry then deserts
Catherine and marries Anne, and they too acquire significant marital
property. With no prohibition on bigamy, Henry’s actions are entirely
legal. Ten years after Henry’s marriage to Anne, Catherine files for
divorce. Despite the delay, Catherine will now receive her day in court,
alleviating some of the concerns raised by plural marriage.294
Unfortunately, new problems arise. First, there is the question of who
Catherine must divorce—is she simply divorcing Henry or is this now
a polygamous marriage amongst all three parties, which would require
her to file for divorce from both Henry and Anne?295 Once that issue is

291. See DONALD WITTMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ORGANIZATION 218
(2006) (“[T]here is typically a greater emotional bond between a married couple than between
business partners. The conflict between two people who love each other is likely to be less than
the conflict between two people with greater self interest.”).
292. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(e) (NAT’L. CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 1973) (“Terms of the agreement set forth in the
decree are enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including
contempt, and are enforceable as contract terms.”).
294. Namely, the concerns about whether couples come to fair and equitable agreements
when they divorce.
295. For a thoughtful discussion of such practical concerns, see Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating
Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1959
(2010) (contrasting “polygamy with aspects of partnership law to derive a set of default rules that
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resolved, the court and the parties must contend with the question of
what property Catherine is entitled to. She could only be entitled to the
property that she and Henry acquired before his marriage to Anne. But
that approach is unsatisfactory given that her marriage to Henry
remained legally in effect after Henry married Anne. Traditionally, any
property acquired by the spouses after marriage and before the entry
of the divorce decree is subject to division at divorce.296 So Catherine
could also be entitled to a share of all of the property acquired by
Henry prior to their formal divorce. But this approach only gives her a
fractionalized interest in the property that he acquired after marrying
Anne because Anne, of course, also has an interest in her marital
property with Henry. In other words, rather than having a one-half
interest in all the property acquired by her or Henry during the entirety
of their marriage, Catherine would only have a one-third interest in
any of the property acquired after Henry married Anne.297 Even if one
could devise a system for dividing the property equitably, there
remains the challenge of simply ascertaining when all the property was
acquired.298
Further, this dilemma can cause a perverse incentive—if
Catherine maintains a claim to a percentage of the property that Henry
acquires with his subsequent spouse, Catherine might be inclined to
wait as long as possible to file for divorce. This would again undermine
the states’ interest in encouraging prompt divorces.299 Thus, were
polygamy legalized, not only would there be a concern for married
couples who refuse to divorce before marrying others, but there could
also be financial complications resulting from divorce proceedings that
are delayed until one spouse has legally married another, third party.
2. Harms to Subsequent Spouses. Legalized polygamy would not
only expose initial spouses to economic harm, but would likewise
imperil the economic interests of subsequent spouses by eviscerating
the law’s current protections for those individuals. As the last
might accommodate polygamy’s marital multiplicity”).
296. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text.
297. All of this would again be compounded by the complications associated with who exactly
Catherine is having to divorce—Henry by himself, or Henry and Anne together.
298. Not to mention the problems stemming from such complications as commingling and
transmutation. See generally J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23
FAM. L.Q. 219 (1989) (exploring the issues inherent in separating individual property from marital
property).
299. See Taylor, supra note 25, at 467 (“Certainly, there are important reasons for
encouraging compliance with legal requirements for such dissolution.”).
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hypothetical illustrates, subsequent spouses would be harmed by any
system in which couples lose the incentive to divorce. Subsequent
spouses would always be at risk of having to split what they believe to
be their exclusive marital property with someone to whom their spouse
had previously been married, thus subjecting the subsequent spouse to
reduced financial protection. In some ways, that would be an
advantage over the current system, which only allows a person to have
one legal spouse at a time. Under current law, a subsequent, bigamous
marriage would be void, providing subsequent spouses with no interest
whatsoever in marital property.300 As noted earlier, however, the law
has adopted a number of doctrines to protect against this harm: the
subsequent marriage presumption, the marriage by estoppel doctrine,
and the putative spouse doctrine.301 Legalizing polygamy, however,
would essentially eviscerate these protections, putting subsequent
spouses in a much more precarious financial situation than current law
permits.
For instance, the subsequent marriage presumption is driven by
the current legal reality that a person can only have one spouse, and
thus presumes the last-in-time spouse to be a person’s legal spouse.302
Without a numerical limit on spouses, however, the presumption is no
longer needed. In other words, if a person can have more than one
spouse, there is no need for a presumption designed to reduce the
number of possible spouses to just one. Instead, a woman who married
three men in succession would be considered to have three husbands,
each having a claim to her estate. If the polygamy is sequential rather
than concurrent—meaning the wife never intended to have multiple
husbands but never got a divorce from earlier husbands—the result of
having the husbands share equally could be particularly harmful to the
final husband as, in all likelihood, he would be the most dependent on
the property in question, the first two husbands having already moved
on and built lives elsewhere.303
Marriage by estoppel would be equally unnecessary because a
previously botched divorce would no longer be a bar to the subsequent
marriage’s validity.304 There would be less incentive for either party to
300. See RANSFORD C. PYLE & CAROL M. BAST, FOUNDATIONS OF LAW: CASES,
COMMENTARY AND ETHICS 354 (6th ed. 2016) (defining bigamy as “a crime” and noting that “a
bigamous marriage is void”).
301. See supra Part III.B.
302. See supra Part III.B.1.
303. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part III.B.2.
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a divorce to bring up the fact that one of them failed to properly end a
previous marriage. After all, doing so could potentially bring an
additional person (that is, the previous spouse) into the proceedings,
resulting in the original parties’ receiving a smaller percentage of the
marital estate.305
The putative spouse doctrine is the only one of the three that
would retain some utility given that, regardless of the legality of plural
marriage, there would still be situations in which a person mistakenly,
but in good faith, thought he was married to another.306 The doctrine
would probably be used much less frequently, though, because it is
typically employed in cases where the subsequent marriage was invalid
due to one of the parties never having divorced their previous spouse—
a situation that would no longer be an obstacle to the validity of the
subsequent marriage were polygamy to be legalized.
In sum, formal, legal divorce protects not only the two former
spouses but also the subsequent spouses of those individuals. To more
fully incentivize formal divorce between separating couples, however,
the states rely on their ability to criminalize bigamy—a tool they would
be forced to forfeit should polygamy become a constitutional right. In
the absence of any criminal penalty, separating couples would be more
likely to choose mutual desertion over divorce, risking not only their
own economic well-being, but that of their subsequent spouses as well.
B. A Complete Ban is Necessary To Safeguard the States’ Interest
As discussed above, legalizing polygamy could very well prompt a
number of serial monogamists to become sequential polygamists, thus
exposing both the spouses and the state to significant harm.307 Much of
that analysis, however, is premised on the assumption that the right to
engage in polygamy would come with no more restrictions than
currently attend marriage. Some may argue that the proper limitations
could greatly ameliorate many of the concerns outlined in this Article,
so that—if polygamy falls within the fundamental right to marry—the
states’ objections to plural marriage would be insufficient to justify a
complete ban. As the Court has made clear, if a state wishes to restrict
a fundamental right, it must do more than simply prove that it possesses
a substantial interest; the state must prove that its approach to
safeguarding that interest does not encroach the constitutional right
305. See supra notes 296–98 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part III.B.3.
307. See supra Part IV.A.
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any more than necessary.308 In both Zablocki and Turner, for instance,
the Court struck down state restrictions on marriage because,
according to the Court, those prohibitions were much broader than
were necessary to achieve their stated purpose.309
Accordingly, the question arises as to whether states could impose
limitations on the right to polygamous marriage that would distinguish
polygamy from bigamy so as to permit the former (i.e., concurrent
polygamy) yet prohibit the latter (i.e., sequential polygamy).310 In other
words, perhaps a state could craft its laws in such a way that polygamy
is available to those who affirmatively wish to engage in that precise
practice, yet unavailable to others who attempt to use polygamy merely
as an excuse to avoid divorce proceedings prior to marrying a
subsequent spouse. There are two possible ways that the law could
effectuate that discrete goal. First, the law could condition validity on
the requirement that parties to an existing marriage must each consent
to the addition of a subsequent spouse. Second, if adding spouses over
time is problematic, the law could also require that only unmarried
individuals enter into a polygamous marriage, essentially resulting in
the requirement that all parties to a plural marriage must wed in one
single ceremony. Ultimately, both options fail to safeguard the states’
substantial interest in protecting their citizens.
1. Gradual Polygamy with Consent. Returning to the parties in the
previous hypotheticals, assume that Henry marries Catherine and the
two later decide to expand into a polygamous marriage. The two meet
Anne, and everyone agrees that Anne should join the marriage. In
order to accommodate such situations while also minimizing the
potential for sequential polygamy, the law could condition legal
sanction of a polygamous marriage on the consent of all parties to the
marriage. Unfortunately, though, the ex ante consequences of this
scheme are problematic.
Allowing a married couple to agree to add another spouse to the
marriage gives rise to concerns about duress and coercion. One way to
understand these concerns is to examine courts’ existing suspicion of
postnuptial agreements, which itself parallels courts’ skepticism of

308. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 109, 116–17 and accompanying text.
310. As noted earlier, some have already attempted to distinguish the two terms. See supra
note 31 and accompanying text. The issue becomes, however, whether the state could adopt
meaningful distinctions that would permit one practice while prohibiting the other.
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settlement311 and prenuptial agreements.312 Like a prenuptial
agreement, a postnuptial agreement “is an agreement that determines
a couple’s rights and obligations upon divorce,”313 but the difference is
that the parties enter into the agreement after already having been
married.314 Given the timing, the courts are quite suspicious of such
agreements—even more so than they are of prenuptial and settlement
agreements. As one court explained:
A [postnuptial] agreement stands on a different footing from both
a premarital and a separation agreement. Before marriage, the parties
have greater freedom to reject an unsatisfactory premarital contract.
...
A separation agreement, in turn, is negotiated when a marriage
has failed and the spouses “intend a permanent separation or marital
dissolution.” . . . The family unit will no longer be kept intact, and the
parties may look to their own future economic interests. . . . The
circumstances surrounding [postnuptial] agreements in contrast are
“pregnant with the opportunity for one party to use the threat of
dissolution ‘to bargain themselves into positions of advantage.’”315

Stated differently, there is a fear that a person may threaten to divorce
his spouse unless she agrees to sign a postnuptial agreement and the
spouse—determined to preserve her marriage, or at least the benefits
flowing from that marriage—may be willing to agree to almost
anything, including an agreement that is contrary to her best
interests.316 After all, “[w]hile it is lawful and not against public policy
for husband and wife to enter into such contracts, . . . they are not
dealing with each other as strangers at arm’s length.”317

311.
312.
313.
314.

See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 828 (2007).
See SHARON THOMPSON, PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF FREE
CHOICE: ISSUES OF POWER IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 91 (2015) (distinguishing “unmarried
parties entering prenups” from “married parties entering postnuptial agreements”).
315. Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 962–63 (Mass. 2010) (footnote omitted) (quoting
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
7.01(1)(c), at 946 (AM. LAW INST. 2002); then quoting Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 62 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)).
316. See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 603–04 (1998) (discussing how “divorce threat” may
prompt one spouse to strike a “disadvantageous bargain out of a self-interested fear of
defection”).
317. In re Estate of Gab, 364 N.W.2d 924, 926 (S.D. 1985) (quoting Keith v. Keith, 156 N.W.
910, 911 (S.D. 1916)).
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For the foregoing reasons, postnuptial agreements are thus subject
to increased scrutiny.318 As with prenuptial and settlement agreements,
courts review postnuptial agreements closely for fairness and
equitability. As one court explained:
Although we agree with the defendant that principles of contract law
generally apply in determining the enforceability of a postnuptial
agreement, we conclude that postnuptial agreements are subject to
special scrutiny and the terms of such agreements must be both fair
and equitable at the time of execution and not unconscionable at the
time of dissolution.319

The concerns that animate the courts’ treatment of postnuptial
agreements mirror the issues presented by allowing spouses to consent
to plural marriage and should militate against allowing married couples
to agree to add additional spouses to an existing marriage. For true
polygamists who desire an active plural marriage, these concerns may
be minimal, but concerns are much more grave for sequential
bigamists. Consider an individual who previously separated from his
spouse but now wishes to remarry. If polygamy were permitted with
the permission of the current spouse, divorce is not necessary to enable
the “nonpolygamist” to remarry; instead, he simply has to get his
existing spouse to consent. That consent could be acquired through
negotiation, although perhaps to the detriment of the first spouse. As
the courts are concerned with the bargaining chips used to secure a
postnuptial agreement, then, they should likewise be concerned with
those used to secure an agreement to add an additional spouse to an
existing marriage.
Again, in a legal scheme that allows polygamy with the consent of
existing spouses, plural marriage would be available to all citizens,
including purposefully polygamous couples and sequentially bigamous
couples. The latter, however, could use this option simply to avoid
divorce and any resulting financial liabilities. Compare the following
hypothetical to the one that began this section: Henry marries
Catherine, but later decides he would prefer to have Anne as his wife.
Catherine is in poor health and is worried that a divorce will leave her
without health insurance, which she receives through Henry’s
318. Id. at 925.
319. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 23 (Conn. 2011); see also THOMPSON, supra note 314, at
91 (“[M]arital property agreements entered into by spouses (for example postnuptial or
separation agreements) are subjected to a much higher level of scrutiny [given that] the parties
are not ordinary business partners.”).
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employer as his spouse. Henry, concerned about the financial
implications of divorcing Catherine, tells her that, if she consents to his
marriage to Anne, he need not divorce Catherine and she can continue
to enjoy his health benefits. He further agrees to rent an apartment for
her and to give her a small allowance each month. Though Catherine
would have received significantly more as part of a divorce action, she
agrees to Henry’s terms. Catherine is accordingly harmed by accepting
Henry’s offer in lieu of filing for divorce. Further, as noted earlier,
should she later change her mind and file for divorce, Anne is now also
a legal spouse to the marriage and, as such, would likely have some
claim to at least some of the marital property, thus resulting in a
diminution of Catherine’s share.320
So while consent may seem a good way to mitigate some of the
concerns over plural marriage, those who have no interest in true
polygamy could nonetheless take advantage of the consent provision
to evade the divorce requirement. Spouses in Catherine’s position
would be once again exposed to the potential for extreme financial
harm. Thus, when considering the prisoner’s dilemma that can arise in
the marital context, the law must be mindful of not only the coercion
that exists between the two prisoners and the state, but also the
coercion that might arise between two “prisoners” who, unlike those
in the traditional hypothetical, are allowed to communicate with one
another.321
Of course, simply because a court should be skeptical of certain
kinds of agreements does not mean that those agreements should be
illegal. Courts are skeptical of postnuptial agreements, but most states
still permit couples to enter into them.322 In theory, states could wait to
grant a plural marriage license until the consent agreement has been
carefully reviewed for coercion and duress, but two problems still
remain. First, there is the basic question of whether any polygamous
marriage is truly consensual.323 Second, even if a court could discern
320. See supra notes 296–98 and accompanying text. One could perhaps argue that the
awareness of these resulting penalties would provide new incentives to divorce, but “[f]rustration
of an individual’s reasonable economic expectations, which will often result in increasing the
already crowded welfare rolls, is not the most appropriate method” of incentivizing divorce.
Taylor, supra note 25, at 467. Given the states’ interest in safeguarding the economic security of
their citizens, this seems an insufficient protection.
321. See Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Collective Coercion, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1599, 1610–
11 (2016) (describing the prisoner’s dilemma as a collective coercion problem).
322. See supra notes 313–19.
323. See Davis, supra note 295, at 2008 (recognizing “the difficulty of discerning consent and
the fear of duress or other more subtle forms of coercion”); Laurie Shrage, Polygamy, Privacy,
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whether a polygamy agreement was truly consensual, such
adjudication would typically not happen until some indeterminate time
in the future—the point at which one of the original signatories raises
lack of consent as a defense. With premarital and postmarital
agreements, for example, a court generally is not called upon to
determine their validity until one of the parties has died or the couple
is divorcing. The same would be true of a postmarital polygamy
agreement—there would likely be no question until one of the parties
sought to either enforce the agreement or have it declared invalid. By
then, enough time would have potentially passed that sorting out the
property interests of the multiple parties would be enormously
difficult, if not impossible.324 After all, the parties to the marriage may
have joined at various times and via various polygamy agreements—
some valid and some not—with the result that some members of the
purported plural marriage are legally married to one, but not all, of the
individuals comprising the intended group. And, of course, for those
who attempted to join the marriage by way of a polygamy agreement
that was subsequently found to be coercive, their entry into the
“marriage” would presumably be invalid, leaving them without the
vital protections of state marriage law.
2. Instant and Complete Polygamy. States could also permit
polygamy on the condition that polygamous marriages can only be
entered into by people who are currently single. In other words, the
law would require all parties to the plural marriage to be married at
one time, in a single wedding ceremony. Thus, returning to our
hypothetical, if Henry wants to be married simultaneously to both
Catherine and Anne, then instead of adding Anne at a later date, all
three parties would have to be currently unmarried and would have to
wed at the same time. Doing so would help ameliorate—although
certainly not eradicate—the concern that a spouse could be coerced
into adding another spouse to an existing marriage. Nonetheless, this
alternative solution is also problematic.
As an initial matter, most polygamists would likely consider this
requirement incompatible with the traditional practice of polygamy.
and Equality, in AFTER MARRIAGE: RETHINKING MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 160, 178 n.28
(Elizabeth Brake ed., 2016) (conceding that, when it comes to polygamy, “judging genuine
consent is likely to be difficult”).
324. Of course, even if the polygamous marriage were upheld, the question of how property
would be distributed at divorce is far from certain. See Davis, supra note 295, at 1990 (noting that,
with polygamy, “the division of spousal property at divorce will be uncertain”).
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Typically, “polygamists do not present themselves as a complete(d)
‘group’ when they marry, but rather contemplate adding spouses
serially.”325
Beyond this practical concern, a requirement that polygamous
marriage can only be sanctioned if the parties marry in a single mass
ceremony would likely result in polygamists adopting one of two
responses, both of which pose dangerous consequences. First, current
spouses would simply divorce and remarry whenever they wanted to
add an additional spouse. For instance, if Henry were married to
Catherine but wanted to add Anne to the marriage, he and Catherine
would first need to divorce and then enter into a new marriage
involving all three spouses. Given the complexities and time
commitment involved in divorce proceedings, it is doubtful many
couples would elect to go to all that trouble each time a new spouse
was added. More importantly, as discussed earlier, states only wish to
promote divorce as an alternative to desertion.326 States would prefer
for couples who want to be married to maintain that status;327 any
divorce, even if for a short period of time, leaves the parties without
the protections of marriage, exposing them to potential harm for as
long as they remain unmarried, which is especially dangerous if they
are unable to remarry as planned.328
Given the complexity and time commitment involved in divorce
proceedings, individuals seeking to create a polygamous marriage
would likely wait until all, or at least most, of the desired spouses had
been identified and assembled before entering into a legal polygamous
marriage. This approach presents a new, but even more significant,
harm: the earlier partners would have to wait some time before getting
325. Id. at 2007. Therefore, polygamous unions complicate the traditional notion of when a
marriage begins and ends. Id. at 1989. Spouses are usually added serially to polygamous marriages
for financial reasons: at the start of a marriage, there is likely some uncertainty about how many
spouses the marriage can support, but as the family’s wealth grows over time, so too does the
ability to support additional spouses. See Witte, supra note 65, at 18. Additionally, in many
cultures, as the original parties to the marriage age, younger wives are added to replace the lost
fertility of older wives. Bennion, supra note 75, at 104
326. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
327. See Mark Strasser, Family, Same-Sex Unions, and the Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF FAMILY LAW AND POLICY 45, 59 (John Eekelaar & Rob George eds., 2014) (noting the states’
interest in the “continuation of marriage”).
328. This outcome of this hypothetical situation—that the law incentivizes temporary
divorce—has really occurred as a byproduct of tax law. See Daniel J. Lathrope, State-Defined
Marital Status: Its Future as an Operative Tax Factor, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 257, 263 (1983)
(“Temporary divorces have been undertaken for tax reasons and temporary marriages have been
suggested as a tax planning strategy for the unmarried.”).
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married and would be without the benefits and protections afforded by
legal marriage for that interim period. Again, this puts those
individuals at risk should something happen that ultimately prevents
them from ever marrying. Ultimately, this result undermines policies a
state may have established to incentivize individuals to marry promptly
in order to protect their financial security.329
A requirement that any polygamous marriage take place all at
once is, at best, likely unworkable and, at worst, an incentive to delay
marriage until all the eventual spouses are assembled. Such a delay—
which, should the anticipated marriage never take place, would be
eternal—can prove devastating to those who spent years in a
relationship devoid of the legal safeguards marriage affords. After all,
marriage offers much greater protections to those who are financially
dependent on an intimate partner—as those in many polygamous
relationships tend to be330—than mere cohabitation.331
Clearly, perverse incentives arise from both possible
accommodations that states could make to simultaneously permit
purposeful concurrent polygamy and prohibit sequential bigamy.
These possible accommodations contravene individuals’ best interests
and the interests of the state. For purposes of satisfying strict scrutiny,
then, a complete ban on polygamy is already narrowly tailored. Any
attempt to carve out an exception for those who truly wish to engage
in concurrent polygamy has too many attendant detriments to make it
an actual solution.

329. See Kohm, supra note 207, at 1246 (“Without marriage, those who live together until
death do not receive these automatic estate-planning benefits and are left vulnerable to a great
deal of problems.”).
330. See Janet Bennion, History, Culture, and Variability of Mormon Schismatic Groups, in
MODERN POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES
101, 113 (Cardell K. Jacobson & Lara Burton eds., 2011) (describing women within the FLDS
community as being “isolated, financially dependent, [and] uneducated”).
331. Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law Reform, in
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 331, 332 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (“[I]nformal
unions . . . provide uncertain protection to financially dependent family members because the
right to a share of property and support is legally established only after the relationship ends. In
contrast, marriage is a status based on registration under which rights and obligations attach at
the outset with the exchange of vows.”).
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CONCLUSION
In light of society’s increasing acceptance of nontraditional
families,332 polygamy is “no longer relegated to the hidden cultish
confines of southern border towns and western desert wastelands.”333
This change in perception, coupled with the legalization of same sex
marriage, has brought to light the question whether, under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, polygamy might
likewise fall within the fundamental right to marriage. This Article
argues, however, that the answer to that question is largely irrelevant.
The crucial issue is instead whether—even if polygamy were included
within that right—the states nonetheless have a compelling
justification for continuing their refusal to recognize plural marriage.
This Article answers that in the affirmative: yes, states do have such an
interest, and it is the promotion of divorce. Not the promotion of
divorce at the expense of marriage, but the promotion of divorce over
the alternative of desertion.
The state’s interest in protecting families and individuals’ financial
interests forces it to both encourage marriage and, should those
marriages end, incentivize formal divorce. But legalizing polygamy
deprives the state of one of its most powerful incentives for divorce:
the prohibition on being married to more than one person at a time
and the subsequent inability to remarry without first divorcing an
existing spouse. Without that incentive, separating couples will face a
full-fledged prisoner’s dilemma between electing for formal divorce
and simply going their separate ways. More specifically, if polygamy
becomes legal, remarriage while still legally married to someone else
likewise becomes permissible. In such a society, spouses might—in
light of the costs associated with divorce—be more tempted to simply
end their marriages informally, to the great detriment of not only the
parties to that marriage but those whom the parties may subsequently
wed. Particularly at risk here are the poor, who are much less
332. Marissa J. Holob, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers from
Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1492, 1510 (2000) (noting
the “growing acceptance and proliferation of nontraditional families”); see also Elizabeth S. Scott
& Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family
Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 297 (2015) (“Some observers suggest that even
polygamous relationships are becoming ‘normalized,’ pointing to the popularity of the television
series Big Love and Sister Wives.”).
333. BENNION, supra note 75, at 3.
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susceptible to the other, property-based incentives to divorce. To
protect those vulnerable parties who need the protections guaranteed
by formal marriage and, correspondingly, formal divorce, the states
thus have a compelling interest in continuing to prohibit polygamy in
any form.

